Parece mentira que a estas alturas todavía nos creamos ciertas cosas... ningún sistema, ninguno, ni ruso, ni americano, ni alienígena, logra "plenos".
En otro orden de cosas, un nuevo informe de RUSI sobre la guerra aérea, con datos interesantes: https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air- ... -final.pdf
Una cosa en concreto que comentamos hace unas semanas: In early March, however, Russian SAM defences rapidly became much better coordinated and the threat from long-range S-400 ‘Triumph’ SAM systems based in Belarus and Crimea forced Ukrainian aircraft to fly at extremely low altitude – below 100 ft – for most of their sorties on the northern and southern axes. The threat from these long-range SAMs was compounded by the presence of a Russian S-band 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude radar in Belarus covering the Kyiv axis, and another in the south (which was later destroyed near Nova Kakovkha). These mobile radar systems were introduced in 2018, and have allowed Russian forces to track Ukrainian fixed-wing and rotary sorties at altitudes as low as 15 ft at well over 150 km. Given the method of operation of the Podlet-K1, it is unlikely to be capable of successfully supplying the high-resolution data required for terminal guidance illumination of low-flying targets at longer ranges. The success on various occasions of low-flying Ukrainian fighters in ambushing Russian high-altitude patrols during the first week of the war in areas covered by the Podlet K-1 system would suggest it only gives a relatively low-resolution tracking capability. On the other hand, this may simply indicate a poor dissemination of surveillance information from the radar to the Il-20M ‘Coot’ airborne command post and relay aircraft passing information from ground networks to patrolling Russian fighters. However, Podlet-K1 was designed to allow modern S-300 variants and the S-400 system to fire long-range missiles at a detected target, relay mid-course updates on the target movements to the missiles while in flight, and hence guide the missile close enough to detect and lock on to the aircraft in question with its own active radar seeker head as it descends from a high apex. The confident Ukrainian attribution of the loss of several aircraft to S-400 missile engagements while flying at very low altitude and at significant distances would, therefore, seem to suggest that longer-ranged missiles fired by these SAM systems do indeed possess a post-apex lock-on capability as previously theorised.
Los S-400 sí tendrían capacidad contra objetivos en vuelo bajo, pero no gracias a un sistema como el NIFC-CA de la US Navy, sino gracias a ese radar Podlet, que no es infalible pero sí permite atacar a objetivos que vuelan por debajo del horizonte radar.
