Ildefonso Machuca escribió:hola KRAKEN... obviando las necedades...
Dice el necio.
Ildefonso Machuca escribió:y dale que dale... tiembla KRAKEN si a los australianos se les atraviesa NAVANTIA y la demandan...
Si hubiesen sido fallos injustificables como has mentido, si las responsabilidad fuese de Navantia, como has mentido, el Gobierno australiano lo hubiese señalado claramente y exigido las oportunas compensaciones. De libro, salvo para tu cabecita claro.
Ildefonso Machuca escribió:Kraken escribió:Responsabilidades, a Navantia le otorgan nuevos contratos y la meten en la toma de decisiones y gestión del Consorcio, a ASC los amenazan con dejarlos fuera de futuros contratos y le retiran su toma de decisiones en el Consorcio AWD.... si es que no tienes ni idea de lo que escribes.
CLARO !!!... solo te lo recuerdo...
Quedando claro que no entiendes nada.
Ildefonso Machuca escribió:NAVANTIA simplemente no cumplió con "...obligations for all parties to carry out their respective roles..." asi que lo unico que le han puesto en claro a NAVANTIA es que asuma su responsabilidad dentro de lo contratado... acaso por hacer esto estan cobrando algo adicional a lo inicialmente pautado...
Sí, están cobrando por los ingenieros desplazados y el trabajo realizado, aunque con descuento de "amigo" para favorecer los contratos pendientes. Que eso de que BAE se gasta su pasta en Lobbies para quedarse el contrato y los australianos no traguen hay que compensarlo.
Pero manda tu curriculum a BAE, como difamador profesional puede que te ganes mejor la vida.
Ildefonso Machuca escribió:vaya ya lo expliqué... y ahora lo enrrollas... o te la quieres tirar de "sabiondo"...
No, mientes una y otra vez con lo del "AEGIS de Raytheon", pero vamos puedes seguir, no me canso de reírme con tus bulos y tonterías.
Ildefonso Machuca escribió:venga lorito... repite que repite... por lo menos respecto tu primer post ya has entendido la responsabilidad de Raytheon...
Nueva mentira, siempre he dejado bien clara la responsabilidad de Raytheon. Eres tú el que dice tontería tras tontería al respecto y ahí están los post para quien los quiera ver. Si es que quedas retratado con cada mentira.
Kraken escribió:
submarinos-y-mas-submarinos-t3751-390.html#p1637964
Responsabilidad ninguna, es todo bajo el control del DMO y la integración es cosa de Raytheon como contratista principal, tanto de los sistemas propios como de los australianos.
Pero entiendo que tu cabecita no pueda entender eso.
Ildefonso Machuca escribió:esto no te lo crees ni TU mismo...
con lo detallistas y ascertivos que son los australianos con sus controles y auditorias... esto se les paso por debajo de la mesa...
HORROR !!!
sigue KRAKEN... sigue no mas...
Veamos lo que dicen los australianos...
While Defence has subsequently sought to address design, construction and productivity issues through DMO involvement in Alliance governance and program management, and the application by the Industry Participants of new strategies during the build phase, substantial performance issues were ongoing in late 2013. As mentioned above, the continuing detailed design, construction
and productivity issues present a significant risk of further overruns in the cost of the project, as well as in the delivery schedule, and will require an ongoing management focus. Further, the program is approaching the complex stage of systems integration when, historically, cost and schedule risks tend to rise.17
The ANAO has previously observed that it is not uncommon for major projects, including Defence projects, to experience cost overruns and integration issues. There is a tendency for initial estimates to be optimistic, contingencies to be too low, the severity of risks to be underestimated, delays to be more extensive than anticipated and the complexity of integration issues not to be fully appreciated.
Vaya, no les resulta tan raro.
For example, even the five keel blocks built by Navantia in Spain have required rework.
There has been an average of 2.75 revisions per drawing (as at March 2013), and revised drawings were still being provided in late 2013. This process has led to costly and out‐of‐sequence rework in cases where construction work already undertaken no longer matched the design.24
Que malos los de Navantia que hacían revisiones continuas de diseño, ah no, que solo hacía lo que le pedían los de la alianza, que cosas.
Ildefonso Machuca escribió:NAVANTIA simplemente no cumplió con "...obligations for all parties to carry out their respective roles..." asi que lo unico que le han puesto en claro a NAVANTIA es que asuma su responsabilidad dentro de lo contratado... acaso por hacer esto estan cobrando algo adicional a lo inicialmente pautado...
De responsabilidad ninguna, Navantia, repetimos una vez más: estaba fuera de la Alianza, ahora la han metido en la Alianza y le han dado responsabilidades en el proyecto. Por ser malos,toma ya, además del contrato para los LHD y el de estudio del Sea 5000, todo eso por mantas. Si es que no sabes que inventarte.
Ildefonso Machuca escribió:como ves los australianos tienen la situación muy clara y con la "inclusión" formal de NAVANTIA en el "team" lo que buscan es poner "orden" y buscar minimizar los daños y perdidas... y no ponerse a pelear y hacer que un proyecto que se puede salavar y componer... termine en el desguace... AMIGO... son otras formas de trabajo muy DISTINTAS,,, ellos buscan resolver... y no CULPAR Y CONDENAR...
no lo entiendes... mira ya ese no es mi problema
Que mentiroso eres...
Los australianos reconocen que la cagaron al separar al diseñador del proyecto y por eso meten ahora a Navantia en el ajo, para que no se vuelvan a repetir los errores de gestión, gestión de la que Navantia NO formaba parte.
AWD, like any other frigate program, is a very complex program, and this requires the shipbuilder to cope with several revisions to the drawings in order to capture the latest technical information available, which comes from many different sources and is often out of the designer’s control. This process is natural within the business, and the contractor needs to be prepared to
effectively manage revisions so as to minimise cost and schedule impact.ASC and the Alliance did not and do not have the experience or the skills level to manage revisions in the most effective manner, with the result that revisions have a greater impact than could be expected.
Navantia recommends a comprehensive analysis of the current management procedures to achieve significant improvements in productivity.
As discussed in paragraph 3.14, the intention of including the Platform System Designer in the Alliance arrangement did not eventuate. The DMO’s Phase 2 Overall Program Report states that neither Navantia nor Gibbs & Cox were prepared to agree to the liability regime that the Alliance contract was to impose, and in the absence of an alliance arrangement, the Commonwealth’s relationship with the US and Spanish governments was expected to improve access to government‐owned Intellectual Property.209 The then value of the Platform System Design work (some $300 million) was low when compared to the then cost of the Alliance contract (some $4.2 billion), and there was limited incentive for Navantia to put its own profit share at risk by entering an
Alliance arrangement with a new shipbuilder, and taking part in the pain‐ share gain‐share regime it imposed on potential profit. For its part, Navantia informed the ANAO in October 2013 that there was a lack of clarity with respect to the proposed liability regime. Navantia stated that:
When the possibility of being part of the AWD Alliance was on the table, it was not clear to the parties how to integrate Navantia into the Alliance.
Navantia considered it clearer and more appropriate that the contract be made with DMO (although it could have been made with ASC), and this course of action was quickly agreed with the AWD Alliance.
3.73 Defence decided to form a separate Platform System Design contract with Navantia. Defence sought to minimise the impact of Navantia’s absence from the Alliance by incorporating provisions into the Alliance and PSD contracts that provide for cooperation and collaboration between Navantia and the Alliance.
3.74 Over several years, a substantial amount of design change and updated documentation has been introduced into the AWD construction program (see paragraphs 5.43 to 5.74 and Figure 5.10). While the Alliance has applied a range of strategies to address detailed design immaturity, the problem and its consequences were ongoing in 2013. The most recent initiatives to improve the
design‐to‐production process have included measures to better incorporate Navantia’s knowledge and experience into the Alliance.210 Nevertheless, Navantia is not represented on any of the key Alliance governance bodies,including the Project Board.
3.75 The fact that the Platform System Designer is not part of the Alliance has detracted from the Alliance’s ability to collectively and collaboratively manage risks, which is one of the main reasons for establishing such an arrangement. In practical terms, Navantia’s relative ‘distance’ from the project, compared to the Alliance Industry Participants, has contributed to difficulties in addressing detailed design immaturity issues in the most timely way possible, resulting in more out‐of‐sequence rework than was budgeted for.
Navantia’s absence from the Alliance arrangements has resulted in an incomplete alignment of incentives for sharing of best practices and for reducing costs from design conception through to shipbuilding and ship acceptance.211
3.76 The design issues have highlighted that, ideally, an alliance should include all of the key industry contributors to the task being undertaken, as initially envisaged for the AWD Program. When it is not possible to achieve a comprehensive alliance arrangement because of the stance taken by an industry contributor, appropriate governance and operational arrangements should be established to mitigate the associated risks and enable effective integration between the key contributors to the project.
Pero vamos, seguro que inventas algo nuevo con lo que divertirnos.
Ningún plan, por bueno que sea, resiste su primer recorte presupuestario.
la nota 24
. Defence sought to minimise the impact of Navantia’s exclusion from the Alliance by incorporating provisions into the Alliance and Platform System Design contracts that provide for cooperation and collaboration between Navantia and the Alliance, including delegation of responsibility for the day‐to‐day management of the Platform System Design contract to the Industry Participants. Nevertheless, 
