Se ha de decir que el estado de la AV-MF Flota Báltico no se puede conjugar a la del VVS porque el primero recibe su presupuesto como parte de la Marina (VMF) y la segunda independientemente
Voy a buscar las declaraciones del CINC Mijailov que dieron lugar a estas contra-declaraciones, de todas maneras todo esto fué hace 13 meses, de todos modos interesante.
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - JANUARY 28, 2004
Russia's combat aviation in 'uncontrollable' decline
Nikolai Novichkov JDW Correspondent
The official statement that Russia's air combat capability in 2003 was healthy and improving has come under fire from high-ranking aviation generals.
Lt Gen Victor Sokerin, commander of the Russian Federation Navy's (RFN's) Baltic Fleet naval aviation, and Maj Gen Oleg Kolyada, the Russian Federation Air Force's (RFAF's) chief of flight security, have described a very different state of capability to the official 'healthy' claims made by Col Gen Vladimir Mikhailov, RFAF commander (JDW 21 January).
Gen Sokerin considers the RFAF is experiencing an uncontrollable disintegration of its combat aviation. He says maritime aviation has few servicemen with sufficient skills to perform combat duties and claims the situation is not much better in other aviation services. Navy and army aviation are staffed with officers fresh from five years' training whose flying experience is just a few hours, flown mostly with an instructor pilot.
At present, the age of experienced specialist aircrew in the Baltic Fleet air force and air defence force has risen by 10-15 years and keeps growing. There are no interceptor pilots under 36 and only 2% are below 40. Only 3% of first- and second-class pilots are under 36 and just 1% of interceptor navigators are under 40, while 11% of first- and second-class navigators are under 36. Sixty per cent of crew commanders are over 35, with half of them over 40.
In five years' time, according to Gen Sokerin, there will be no-one to carry out combat tasks since all first-class pilots will have retired. Over the last 12 years, the number of aircrew in the Baltic Fleet has fallen by more than a third. The pilots' flying time on the fleet's Sukhoi fighter/strike aircraft is a mere five to seven hours per year because only 10% of the required minimum allocation of aviation fuel is available. Around 50% of pilots make no more than one flight in a year - and then only to qualify for the pilot's food ration and a meritorious service record.
Personnel handling flight preparation and air traffic control (ATC) have to a large extent lost their skills because of the infrequency of flights. No more than three or four aircraft are in the air simultaneously and many officers have no idea how to prepare and control the operation of any type of aircraft in their aviation regiments. The rapid deployment of air power in time of threat or a boost of allocations to the RFAF, which is unlikely, could result in an increased accident rate, predicted to be higher than that sustained during the 1960s reorganisation.
The RFAF has no reserve of senior commanders - a situation that is of great concern to Gen Kolyada, who says that most air accidents occur because of insufficient experience of ATC personnel. Of special concern to him is the lack of discipline standards required for combat among flying staff, technicians and commanders of some aviation units.
Gen Kolyada believes that the unit commanding officers are particularly incompetent in organisation of flying missions. Some squadron/regiment commanders and their deputies do not have the required skills and experience in this field. This decline of professional skills among flying personnel results from the lack of regular flying and the scarcity of intense training exercises. Average flying time per year is between 25 and 60 hours with frontline pilots averaging around 40 hours. It is accepted that not every pilot today is capable of fulfilling a combat task that checks with his 'paper' qualifications. In 2003, the RFAF logged 11 air accidents.