Hola a todos,
Parece ser que el Pentágono va a llevar a cabo una revisión extensa y profunda del programa JSF para determinar su coste real y el de su mantenimiento. La revisión empezará en octubre y durará un año.
La noticia está redactada de una forma un tanto ambigua, al menos para mí, pero según entiendo el Director de Precios de Defensa (DPAP-DP)
Shay D. Assad en marzo dio la primera señal de tal revisión (
https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/as ... ke-fighter). El 1 de septiembre confirmó la revisión de costes anunciando su comienzo en octubre.
En la notica también se da lugar a los comentarios del portavoz de la JPO Joe DellaVedova al respecto.
Esto confirma que tanto el DoD y la JPO como LM no saben, ni nunca han sabido, el precio real del programa ni del mantenimiento del F-35, y que todos los precios y costes, que hasta ahora han estado dando, cada uno diferente, son, en el mejor de los casos, pura fantasía y elucubración:
https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/do ... ve-october
DOD to begin yearlong JSF cost deep-dive in October
September 01, 2017 | Courtney Albon
Editor's note: This story has been updated to include additional information from the F-35 joint program office.
The Defense Department will kick off a yearlong excursion in October to determine the true price of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and will spend the next year working with prime and sub-tier suppliers to develop a strategy to inject competition and incentivize affordability into the department’s most expensive program.
The Pentagon’s pricing chief, Shay Assad, told Inside the Air Force he has been working closely with the F-35 joint program office to develop a plan for the deep-dive review.
“The whole idea of this is to inform the affordability architecture that the JPO has,” Assad said in an Aug. 25 interview. “We know that the Joint Strike Fighter costs too much and it costs too much to sustain. There is no doubt about it.”
Assad announced the review in March as an effort to refine the JPO’s cost-cutting strategy and better understand the price of the aircraft. The review will include two elements: an information-gathering exercise and an effort to identify opportunities to reduce production and sustainment costs by introducing more competition, reducing layers in the supply chain and offering incentives to companies to cut prices.
JPO spokesman Joe DellaVedova said the lessons learned from the review will be "institutionalized within the program."
"The knowledge gained from the deep dive into industry's cost methodologies for buying aircraft systems and subsystems will enable us to translate cost reduction opportunities and written agreements into realized cost savings via contract negotiations," he said in a Sept. 1 email.
The JPO is working to finalize a team of about 40 to 50 experts from throughout DOD to execute the effort, including representatives from the Defense Contract Management Agency, the JPO, the Air Force, Naval Air Systems Command and a group of Navy industrial engineers known as the Navy price fighters. The team will work closely with prime contractor Lockheed Martin, engine-maker Pratt & Whitney and top subcontractors like Northrop Grumman and BAE as well as suppliers to gain insight into how the aircraft is produced.
“The idea is to create a team that the JPO has at its disposal that is a department-wide team that can support them on the implementation of this and then further the work as we move forward,” Assad said. “This isn’t just about what it costs to buy a Joint Strike Fighter today, it’s about what it costs to maintain a Joint Strike Fighter in the future.”
The JPO has identified about 60 to 70 suppliers it wants to partner with for the review, Assad said, prioritizing the most important systems and components. He would not discuss who those suppliers are or which systems they produce, but said the JPO has already done a lot of work to identify specific suppliers whose work could have a significant impact on the jet’s acquisition and sustainment costs.
The team will work with those companies to develop individualized strategies to improve affordability -- an exercise that is common in competitive business environments, Assad said, but sometimes gets lost in large government contracts.
“At the end of the day, if we don’t change what we’re presently doing, we probably can’t afford the Joint Strike Fighter as it’s presently structured over its entire life,” he said. “We would like to afford the Joint Strike Fighter in the manner the warfighters believe is supportive and the numbers that they need to sustain it. How do we do it? How do we work together to do it? We would like to use a variety of techniques to work with the companies in a collaborative partnership type of way to say, ‘Look. We have to do this together.’”
Assad said he expects there to be some pushback from companies concerned their revenues might decline if the jet’s price drops. However, Assad noted that a primary driver for the study is to enable the department to buy more jets -- which would support continued revenue for those companies. The trick, he said, will be to communicate to industry that unless something changes, the government can’t afford its current requirement.
“The challenge will be to convince companies that they need to be completely transparent and to convince them that this is not an attack on profitability,” Assad said. “What this is is an attack on lowering the cost and making the Joint Strike Fighter more affordable... We’re willing to pay a reasonable profit for the goods and services.”
The effort, while it has a near-term focus on driving down acquisition costs, will ultimately shape JSF Director Vice Adm. Mat Winter’s approach to developing a long-term sustainment strategy and a plan for follow-on modernization.
“If we do it right, we’re going to inform negotiations, we’re going to inform the affordability architecture, we’re going to inform how [Vice] Adm. Winter decides he wants to implement Block 4,” Assad said.