Mauricio escribió:ecuatoriano escribió:Claro con las reservas del caso dado que es Wikipedia podemos colegir que este aparato que opera desde el 2002 solo ha tenído un accidente fatal, que el problema del rotor de cola data del 2005 y fue reportado como solucionado.
Una vez mas... ¿crees que Hal y los hindues no aprenden de sus errores y mejoran?
Como siempre hace falta recurrir al manoseo y editorialización de la historia para medio maquillar la realidad.
Que bonitas palabras para rehuir constestar preguntas directas,
manoseo y editorialización, wow, ¿mes las prestas?
Primero, eso de que "opera desde el 2002" hay que cogerlo con pinzas, porque en realidad es un programa que data de 1984, con el primer vuelo en 1992. O sea... a pesar de tratarse de un helicóptero netamente derivativo, de un pasticho de modelos ya existentes, que se presta de todo del BK-117 y sus descendientes Eurocopter, de haber recibido toda clase de ayuda técnica de parte de MBB, es un proyecto que tarda una década en pasar de primer vuelo a IOC, que es algo realmente inaudito considerando que, otra vez, no es un helicóptero que incorpore nuevas tecnologías.
Vaya supongo que en los países como Israel o en USA no hay proyectos que se demoran y fracasan?, te suena el Bradley IFV?, hasta ví la película, pero bueno veamos que dice Wikipedia.
Development
One of the early issues that drove the development of the IFV was the need to have a vehicle which could serve in a high-intensity conflict in Europe which was feared might include the use of NBC weapons. To work in such an environment an IFV would have to have a life-support system that protected from outside contaminants while allowing the soldiers to fight from inside the vehicle. The earliest specification, from 1958, called for a vehicle no more that 8 tons, mounting a turret with a 20 mm autocannon and a 7.62 mm machine gun, with sealed firing ports for 5 infantry gunners.[3]
The first U.S. Army IFV design was the XM734, a modified version of the M113. A commanders cupola and passenger firing ports were added. The second design was the XM765 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle, based on the M113A1 chassis. The upper sides of the vehicle were sloped & spaced steel armor plates were added to improve protection. In addition, firing ports for the passengers were added and a M139 20mm cannon was added to the commander's cupola.[3]
In 1963 the U.S. and West German governments began work on the MBT-70 design and an IFV companion project was the Mechanized Infantry combat Vehicle (MICV-70).[3] The contract was handed to the Pacific Car & Foundry Company which delivered the XM701 prototype in 1965. The prototypes had the following characteristics: weight of 25-27 tons (depending on an aluminum or steel hull); 425 HP diesel engine; a 2-man turret with a 20 mm gun & 7.62 mm MG; crew of 3 plus 9 infantry equipped with firing ports; a built-in toilet; armor proof against Soviet 14.5 mm MG fire beyond a certain range; a collective and overpressure CBR system; amphibious.[3] The filtration system provided a shirt-sleeve environment until the passengers dismounted, after that they could not re-pressurize without fear of contamination, but they could plug their suits into the vehicles filtration system. The vehicle was 9 ft high, 20 ft long, and 10 ft wide. After testing the vehicle was criticized for poor mobility and excessive weight and size (it could not be carried aboard a C-130 or a C-141 Starlifter). New specification were written in 1965.
In 1967 the public display of the BMP-1 caused additional interest in the MICV-70 program which concluded its studies in 1968. However, continued disagreements on specifications continued to slow down development,[3]
At this time the Army looked at two alternate vehicles which could be fielded more quickly. The FMC company had developed an IFV version of the M113 which had a 1 man turret mounting a 25 mm gun, a sealed environment, and firing ports. The vehicle weight was 15 tons. The U.S. Army rejected it due to limited mobility which would prevent it from keeping pace with the proposed MBT-70. However, the design was purchased by the Dutch and Belgian governments.[3] The other alternate vehicle was the West German Marder which mounted a 20 mm autocannon, two 7.62 mm MGs, relatively strong steel armor, and full CBR protection. The U.S. Army rejected it due to it not being amphibious, too large and heavy for air transport, and too expensive.[3]
The MICV program continued on and in 1972 a new request for proposals was issued which was won by FMC and they began construction of the XM723 prototype which was completed in 1973. The XM723 weighed 21 tons, had spaced aluminum armor proof against 14.5 mm fire, had a crew of 3 plus 8 infantry, firing ports for the infantry, and a 1-man turret with a 20 mm gun. The commander sat inside the hull. In order to adapt the XM723 to be usable in a recon roll as well as an IFV, in 1976 the turret was replaced with a 2-man turret mounting the 25 mm Bushmaster cannon and TOW missiles (this was the MICV TBAT-II design). Making it a 2-man turret meant that the Commander would be up in the turret thus having a better view of the battlefield. The TOW missiles would give the vehicle a strong anti-armor capability. The value of anti-tank missiles had been well established in the 1973 Yom Kippur war. There was an added political advantage in that the TOW missiles made it an easier sell to Congress as it was a whole new capability not possessed by the M113.[3]
"We in TRADOC...decided to put the TOW on the MICV because we realized that if we did not put the TOW on the MICV, we would probably never have a MICV." –General Don Starry, Army magazine, 1987.
In 1977 the MICV TABA-II was renamed to XM2. The scout version became the XM3. The U.S. Congress was questioning the development of the XM2 due to the high losses incurred by BMP-1s in the 1973 war and suggested the development of a more heavily armored vehicle. The Army argued against this due to concerns about cost, weight, and development time.
"Almost every army you look at is ahead of the American Army, as far as taking care of our infantry. The Russians, are ahead of us, the German, are ahead of us, the Dutch are ahead of us, the French are ahead of us, the Yugoslavians are ahead of us. Almost everybody has a better infantry vehicle that the U.S. Army.
We would have been better off in 1963 when we started to just build the MICV immediately..Are we to to start over again? My guess is that if you start over again, you will have a 10 percent increase in effectiveness and 50 percent increase in cost." –General William E. DePuy, testimony to Congress, 1977
In 1977 Congress ordered two new evaluations of the IFV program, one by the GAO and one by the Department of the Army, under General Pat Crizer. The GAO report was critical of the XM2's height, mobility, complexity, lack of clear doctrinal use, and lack of CBR protection. Based upon this criticism the OMB deleted M2/3 funding from FY 79 budget.[4] In 1978 the Crizer report asserted that the basic design was consistent with doctrine and development of a IFV with superior characteristics would be costly and pose significant developmental risks,[4] An additional study, the IFV/CFV Special Study Group, evaluated whether an improved version of the M113 could be used instead of the M2/3 IFV. Their conclusion was that extensive redesign would be necessary for even marginal improvements in M113 derivatives.[4] In October 1978 Congress reauthorized procurement funds.
The XM2/3 passed the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council Milestone II review in 1979 and final approval for production came from the Secretary of Defense on 1 February 1980.
Wow, desarrollo desde 1963 a 1980, 17 años, no bigdeal, los estadounidenses siempre hacen las cosas bien.
Ahora veamos los hindues.
Hindustan's Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) program was first announced in November 1984,the ALH was designed with assistance from MBB in Germany. The twin 1000 shp Turbomeca TM333-2B turboshafts are mounted above the cabin and drive a four-blade composite main rotor. The ALH makes use of an advanced integrated dynamic system which combines several rotor control features into an integrated module. The civil prototype ALH (Z-3182) first flew on 23 August 1992, at Bangalore, followed by a second civil aircraft (Z-3183), an Army version (Z-3268) and a navalised prototype (N.901) with Allied Signal CTS800 engines and a retractable tricycle undercarriage.Even after the first prototype flew in August 1992, problems arose due to the changing demands of the Indian military, funding, and contractual issues with Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, which was the consultant for design. Further delay was caused by U.S. sanctions after Indian nuclear tests in 1998, which embargoed the engine originally intended to power the helicopter. Then the helicopter used Turbomeca TM 333-2B2 turboshaft producing 746 kW (1000 shp) each and an agreement was signed with Turbomeca to develop a more powerful engine.
Que ineficientes los indues, sin comparación en el mundo.
O sea, hay una década de por medio de desarrollo dilatadísimo y con problemas documentados.
¿podemos decir los mismo del Bradley IFV?
Luego entra en servicio en el 2002 y continúan los problemas documentados, con una deficiente operatividad. Eso es un hecho, lee más. Lee que es algo que se ha comentado en toda la prensa, desde la prensa nacional India, pasando por revistitas de aficionado como AFM, hasta en el Diario de Juana (Jane's).
De que HAL aprende o no de sus errores, ahí alcanza para un tomo entero. Cada planta de HAL he tenido unas patinadas de la patada, amén de ser una compañía plagada de problemas endémicos de burocracia, corrupción y de problemas técnicos que rayan en la incompetencia. Basta dar una mirada a cada uno de sus proyectos para darse cuenta. Lo notorio es que inclusive la historia de horror que es el Tejas y en menor medida el Dhruv, esos son los proyectos que marcharon comparativamente bien. La saga del HPT-32 Deepak es para treparse al techo, la pesadilla para procurar y luego producir bajo licencia al Hawk ya pertenece al Twilight Zone... mismo Hawk que en medio Mundo funciona sin problemas, en India no logran ensamblarlos a tiempo y encima HAL tiene la concha de pasarle la culpa a BAE.
Así que francamente... no, HAL no es una empresa de la que se pueda decir que tienen un alto nivel de proficiencia técnica, considerando la clase de proyectos faraónicos a los que se lanzan. Como taller están pasables.
Bueno al menos tenemos tu opinión clara de una empresa que tiene en el mercado mas de 50 años y que ha fabricado centenares de aeronaves.
Ayer te puse esto y lo ignorastes olímpicamente porque no tienes cómo refutarlo:
Defence chiefs unhappy over frequent grounding of Dhruvs, complain to HAL Ravi Sharma
Bangalore: With a number of Advanced Light Helicopters (ALHs) being frequently grounded because of
paucity of spares and serviceability problems, the three defence Chiefs have expressed unhappiness over the manufacturer, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
The crux of their message is that even as they would like to see a faster and on-time induction schedule, they would also necessarily like to have in their inventories, trouble-free helicopters.
Informed sources told The Hindu that the chiefs had communicated to the HAL, Bangalore that it was paramount that the ALHs be available for flying duties more often than they were at present.
According to a
senior Indian Air Force pilot, while the serviceability of 70 to 80 per cent of all available helicopters was desirable at any given time, the ALHs inducted so far were yet to come close to that figure.
Complaints made The communication is a follow-up to complaints made by senior defence officers including the Deputy Army Chief, when they met officials from the HAL and the Defence Minister A.K. Antony during the latter’s maiden visit to the public sector unit after he had taken charge of the defence portfolio. The Army has been the most vociferous in its protests, since Army Aviation is the biggest user of the ALH.
Majority with Army The ALHs, christened Dhruv, were inducted into the armed forces in 2002 with the first one going to the Coast Guard.
Currently, around 70 Dhruvs have been inducted into the defence forces, with a majority in the inventory of Army Aviation.
While acknowledging that induction was a painful process requiring the setting up of ground support and handling equipment, ground spares support, placing in position warranty and product support teams, senior officials in the HAL agreed that the ALH programme was yet to mature to desirable levels.
Problems compounded Experts said the problems were compounded because the HAL was compelled to
launch the helicopter’s production phase simultaneously with its limited series production phase.
This was because the ALH project, launched in November 1984, was years behind schedule and had to be speeded up.
The sources said the defence major had taken note of the observations regarding the
vibration problem and the non-availability of spares and had initiated corrective steps.
http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/01/stories ... 791100.htm
Es de Agosto del 2007... o sea, a dos años de supuestamente solucionarse los problemas del
rotor de cola, a cinco años de declararse operativos, a 15 años del primer vuelo y a 23 de iniciarse el proyecto...
dime tu si HAL aprende de sus errores o no.
Supongo que pretendes que asumamos que las quejas del primer y mayor usuario del Dhruv se deben al rotor de cola?, mira leí el texto y no encontré las palabras tail y rotor pero quizá me las salté, la queja principal parece ser.
vibration problem and the non-availability of sparesPues los pilotos y pasajeros ecuatorianos no han no se han quejado de problemas de vibraciòn, ni los mecànicos de carencia de partes y piezas.
Vaya que argumentos mas solidos, tienes alguna referencia dura de que no se ha solucionado el problema recurrente o es solo especulación?.
La baja operatividad del Dhruv está documentada
y es un asunto que ventilan desde adentro de las FAS Indias.
Y supongo que ningún sistema occidental en su intruducción ha tenido quejas, en todo caso estamos hablando de una referencia del 2007, hace 2 años.
De algunas ramas, mejor dicho, porque la Armada no lo quiso ni embutido.
Según leí la armada no lo desea porque no cumple las especificaciones técnicas para la aviación naval de la India, despuès de probarlo.
Y tampoco es gran secreto, porque además de manejarse en la prensa, hay montones de Blogs de defensa Indios donde se comenta al respecto y donde se hacen eco de los problemas de control de calidad en general.
La pérdida de ese Dhruv particular por fallas en los compuestos del rotor de cola es sangrante porque no se descubrió que había un batch completo de partes hechas con resinas inadecuadas hasta que hubo una investigación. O sea, sabemos del que se perdió... pero data acerca de cuántas unidades estaban afectadas nunca se ventiló.
Una vez mas, muy estricto y lapidario con Dhruv y con HAL, crees que eso no ha pasado en la aviación occidental, claro el Airbus de AirFrance no falló en medio del Atlantico.
Veamos por ejemplo esto:
IAF receives three of grounded Dhruvs
Girja Shankar Kaura
Tribune News Service
New Delhi, June 6 ¿de que año?
More than six months after the entire lot of the indigenously manufactured advanced light helicopter (ALH) Dhruv was grounded, the Indian Air Force (IAF) yesterday received the first three of its grounded inventory, cleared by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for active flying.
The Tribune had first reported the grounding of Dhruv by the IAF, which was done following the crash on November 25 last of a civilian variant ordered by the Jharkhand Government due to a defect in tail rotors.
The three arms of the Indian armed forces, which had more than 45 helicopters in their inventory, then grounded Dhruv due to safety reason after initial investigations revealed a defect in its tail rotor.
Later, it was discovered during detailed investigation that there was also a problem in its tail rotor gear. Its grounding had also adversely affected the bids being made by India to sell it to other countries that had shown interest in it.
IAF’s safety chief Air Marshal P.S. Ahluwalia said three Dhruv machines had been received by the force yesterday after being cleared for flying by the relevant certification agencies after rigorous tests.
However, reports suggested that the IAF would also carry out further stringent flying tests before it was finally brought back into service.
Air Marshal Ahluwalia, Director General (Inspections and Safety) at the Air Headquarters here, however, described Dhruv as “a sound machine” but admitted to “teething problems in certain components” that needed strengthening.
He said the tail rotor and the tail gearbox had been further strengthened and subsequently the helicopter had passed rigorous scrutiny with flying colours.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) identified that blades of a particular batch had some snags but these were not related to design deficiencies. Investigations following the November, 2005, accident led HAL to issue a technical advisory to all operators of the medium-twin helicopter.
Como se puede ver, tras el
infame accidente fatal,
la flota entera estuvo sin volar por más de seis meses. ¿Que clase de problemas crees tu que pueden llevar a un grounding completo por un período así? Claramente no algo que pueda solucionarse entre mecánicos de la base y claramente no es algo que falló solamente en el siniestrado. Por lo demás que se hayan tenido que reforzar componentes adicionales y no simplemente reemplazar las palas hechas del material deficiente dice mucho.
[/quote]
Una vez mas regresamos al 2005, por cierto el accidente
no fue fatal, hay escribir la verdad, toda la verdad y nada mas que la verdad.
Referencia...
In a recent incident when the tail rotor of one Dhruv developed some technical snag near Hyderabad, the pilot executed a safe landing without any injury to any of the passengers, HAL officials said.
Saturday, Jan 07, 2006
http://www.hindu.com/2006/01/07/stories ... 740300.htm
Pero volviendo al problema en 2005 del rotor.
Chandigarh, January 15
Non-adherence to the laiddown manufacturing process and the use of material whose life had expired resulted in the crashlanding of the Dhruv helicopter, which led to the grounding of the entire helicopter fleet earlier this month.
The crash landing revealed serious fault in the machine's tail rotor. The tail rotors are now being replaced."The fault was a combination of non-compliance of the stipulated manufacturing process as well as use of life-expired consumables that are not easily available," Mr K.P. Puri, Managing Director of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), told The Tribune here today.
The Dhruv, also known as the advance light helicopter, has been designed and developed by HAL and 46 helicopters have been delivered to the armed forces and other government agencies so far.
Mr Puri said these factors led to "de-bonding" of the raisin-based components in the composite tail rotor.
This, he added, produced extra vibrations, leading to imbalance of the tail rotor, which ultimately broke.
The material used in the construction of the tail rotor was procured from a Swiss firm, which no longer produces the stuff. Now similar material is being sourced from an Australian firm, which incidentally, belongs to an Indian entrepreneur.
The HAL chief said 80 per cent of the rotor-blades were being withdrawn.
The replacement of these blades with newly produced ones was expected to be complete within two months.http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060116/cth1.htm
Veamos en conclusiòn el Dhruv tuvo un problema en la producción o diseño como han tenido innumerables proyectos occidentales, HAL lo detècto y corrigió entre 2005 y 2006.
Atención especialmente con esto:
... then grounded Dhruv due to safety reason after initial investigations revealed a defect in its tail rotor.
Later, it was discovered during detailed investigation that there was also a problem in its tail rotor gear.
O sea... no es sólo el defecto de materiales en las palas del rotor como dijo HAL.
De resto, si la FAE cometió un acto de la más completa estupidez al comprar los Dhruv es algo que el tiempo dirá.
Oye cuidado con las palabras "lamentable" y "estupidez" , un tip nada mas, a mí me ha ido mal cuando uso esas palabras.
Lo que si está claro es que es una compra riesgosa porque es transparente que el Dhruv no está maduro. Y el hecho que en la India tengan órdenes de no volarlo a más de 5000 metros, que nunca lo operen al MTOW y que lo hayan sacado adelante con motores que producen un tercio menos de potencia de lo que deseaban, así lo indica.
¿puedes documentar estas afirmaciones?
Pero sobre todo, por encima de todas las cosas, el hecho que hayan decidido seguir operando Cheetaks, Cheetans y Cheetahs del pleistoceno cuando el Dhruv se suponía iba a ser el "silver bullet", la panacea que iba a solucionar todos los problemas de tranporte ligero y medio en las FAS Indias, así como la decisión de comprar 197 LUHs, para mi es una sentencia demoledora. Si el Dhruv fuera lo que HAL dice que es, las FAS Indias no estrían cotizando centenares de Fennecs e intentado obtener la licencia patra hacer casi 200 adicionales.
Cheetaks, Cheetans y Cheetahs fabricados por HAL. En el supuesto de que efectivamente sea como dices ¿cual es el problema?, acaso la fuerza aérea israelí no prefirió los aviones estadounidenses como F-15 y F-16 a su producto nacional Kfir?, eso hace al Kfir un mal producto?, es decir Ecuador, ni Colombia, ni Sri Lanka debieron adquirir ese avión que en su país de origen no fue valorado?, podemos decir lo mismo del Arava?
En fin....
