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Fuerza Aérea India

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Aprovechando las discusiones recientes sobre la IAF, y su alta tasa de accidentes, miren estos dos articulos que conseguí, MUY interesantes ;)

The Aerodynamics of the MiG 21 accidents

Prodyut Das M.Tech. PGCGM, M.Ae.S.I.
Former Professor Mechanical Engineering IIT Kanpur

Are MiG-21 accidents really out of control as the press says it is? or is there a pattern behind the accident rate?


A fighter pilot flies a wing and an Engine. The qualities of the wing like the wing loading, span loading, aspect ratio, section profile of the wing and the qualities of the engine such as power loading and response time determines the flying qualities of a Fighter.

Fighter flying is one of the most hazardous occupations known to man. It is hazardous because the very high speeds, low level flight over inhabited areas in an airspace often attractive to large birds means that both the reaction times and the options available to a pilot in an emergency are often dangerously limited.

This spate of MiG 21 accidents caused much anguish and was widely written about. This paper is an analysis the technical and statistical aspects of the accidents and has some suggestions of future importance.

The MiG 21: a Technical appreciation

It is significant that for 50 years the MiG Design Bureau were at the forefront of fighter design and yet they never used anything but "yesterday's" proven technology to set and maintain the pace ( Note 1).

There is a lesson in that for Indian aircraft designers..

Coming from such a distinguished pedigree it is not surprising that the MiG 21 was remarkable. It combined low cost proven technology with brilliantly innovative and insightful application of the physics to produce at lowest cost the solution of a high altitude bomber interceptor.( Note 2 ) At the time of its induction into the IAF the MiG with its auto stabilization, radio altimeter, fully duplicated controls and general reliability introduced new standards of safety and reliability .Pilots converting to the MiG 21 were universal in their praise for its ease of piloting and safety and the reliability and the functionality its systems. 'Safe as a bullock cart" was how the aeroplane was described in the late '70s.

The Aerodynamics of the MiG 21 in low level flight.

Unfortunately all fighters are designed primarily for air superiority but end up in the more hazardous low level close support role.

This was also the case with the MiG 21.From the 1980s the MiG switched to the close support role. New upgrades to make the type suitable for close support also meant a steady increase in weight. The aircraft became more sluggish and unwieldy particularly during the landing and take off and in circuit where the aerodynamic control forces decline as a square of the flight velocity but the inertias remain the same. The weight increase affected the wing, power and span loadings (please refer toTable A- for the MIG the figures on the top of each box are for the FL those below are for the Bis).

The span loading increases is a good indication of how much more angle of attack has to be generated at a given speed to maintain height. Increase in the angle of attack in turn means more power to stay aloft.

The wing loading increase shows how much more speed has to be increased to maintain level flight. A doubling of wing loading would mean a 40% increase in flight speed. This also means a doubling of the power required.

The power loading indicates how much power is available to accelerate the aeroplane should the airspeed fall too low. I have computed the figure for max dry thrust as in a crisis there would not be those few seconds available for the afterburner to kick in before the aircraft impacted.

A special mention must be made of the low aspect ratio of the MiG 21. The low aspect ratio makes the aircraft "alpha "sensitive. The CL /Cd curve becomes unfavourable in low aspect ratio wings. In other word unless the pilot gets the angle of attack right he may see a very great increase in the drag of the aircraft without any corresponding increase in lift. His total energy would decay preventing the aircraft from accelerating. Translated into reality it means one of the following scenarios: During take off "over rotation" -too much nose up-would mean poor acceleration due to high induced drag and failure to lift off with the aircraft running into the overshoot area at high speed.

During landing the misjudged alpha would increase the induced drag causing the aircraft to slow down, lose lift and hit the ground before reaching the touch down area.

During turn into the finals ( or during low level aerobatics) the aircraft is pulling more 'G"s with corresponding increase in induced drag slowing down the aircraft which is already side slipping because of the turn and losing height over ground. A combination of side slip during a turn with high induced drag reducing speed caused unforeseen height loss and a "controlled flight into terrain".

Very many of the MiG 21s lost were in these three regimes of flight. Even in civil airliners most accidents occur during these three phases but:

1) The alpha sensitivity of the MiG21 ,because of the low aspect ratio of 2.2, requires much more precision than the same maneuver when executed in an aircraft with a aspect ratio of 5.6 as in a basic trainer.

2) The continual, if inevitable, weight increase in the MiG 21 meant that the approach speed in the later marks had to be made at a higher and higher speed. This reduced the amount of surplus power available to accelerate away from a "coffin corner "situation". In India the hot weather meant the engine was producing about 12%less thrust and the wing was producing about 12% less lift to begin with.

3) In case of an emergency, to gain height, the pilot in a Hunter or a Kiran would open up the throttle and pull back the stick- things which are instinctive even in a rookie pilot. Ina MiG the pilot has to push the stick forward, build up his energy and then after a delay of several seconds, pull back the stick to climb away. He may simply not have the time when flying close to the ground.

4) The CK ejection seat, one of the best for high speed high altitude ejection simply was not good enough for low level by modern standards. One of the clever features of the CK seat was that as the seat left the cockpit the canopy- which was hinged to the front of the windshield in the FL - attached itself to the top of the ejection seat and rotated itself until it covered the entire front of the ejection seat- thus giving unparalled blast protection when ejecting at supersonic speed. I remember a Martin Baker engineer getting very interested in how the thing worked. I had seen the seat but he had not! Unfortunately I was not able to help him. The semi -encapsulation feature delayed ejection in that it took too long to get rid of the canopy after clearing the aircraft and this delayed clear release and deployment of the Parachute. The 300 kmph, 100 meters minimum parameters meant that many low level ejections were unsuccessful.

The span loading, wing loading the power loading and the aspect ratio of a series of aircraft flown by the IAF is tabulated at Table A.

Accident rates in supersonic fighters

The accident rates in supersonic fighters of the same generation as the MiG 21 makes for relevant comparisons.


The German Luftwaffe flew about 950 F 104s from about 1960 to 1987 and lost about 292 of them during the same period. Average loss rates were thus about 11 per annum though the peak loss rate was 28 aircraft in 1965 and about the same in 66. The ejection seat of the F104 was even worse that the MiG 21 for low altitude flying. The Germans corrected that by switching over to the Martin Baker GQ 7 seat sometime in the mid sixties.

The Canadians lost half of their fleet of 200 CF 104s during a similar period of service. Training was admittedly a problem with the German Luftwaffe which was barely ten years old at the time of the induction of the F104 but the same could hardly be true about the Canadians.

The true master of the F 104 was the Spanish Ejercito d Aire who never lost a single Starfighter in seven years of service. People said it was due to fine weather over Spain! This usually made the Spanish AF indignant! The British RAF lost over a hundred of their 297 Lightnings in about 25 years of service- a number of them to engine fires which was probably due to a flaw in the detail design. Our MiG losses have been at a much lower rate.

Flying fighters is a hazardous business and continual stress and training on flight safety and discipline without killing the spirit of the Fighter Pilot is a difficult and skilled art.

Interestingly the Pakistan Air Fore lost 23 F7s ( Mig 21 equivalents ) in 10 years which approximates the IAFs loss rates, given their smaller fleet size. It is stated that the PAF possibly reports only those crashes which are in populated areas. In fact the PAF is extremely touchy about anything that shows it in a bad light and it would possibly be that their actual crash rate is higher than the IAFs MiG 21s.

About their image consciousness I remember in the mid 80s there was a review on the PAF in Air International and there were these enormously dirty and dusty MiG 19s with chipped yellow and red paint and oil streaked fuselages and generally looking very neglected though the MiG 19s were right there on the flight line. Someone obviously got (and deserved ! ) a "rocket" because since then I have never seen a PAF aircraft in any magazine that did not look as if it has just come out of the paint booth.

One notes that there are 4 mid air collisions in the 23 PAF losses reported- the MIGs outward view was never its strong selling point. I feel the mid air collisions were more for this type. A switch to a glass cockpit and bulged hood ( to raise the pilot's eye line) may be useful at least in improving forward view.. Another reason could be due to the very small wing span in comparison to the fuselage length. In formation flying the aircraft would be that much closer together. In a turn, with the poorer visibility sometimes the collision was inevitable.

What should be the accident rates? Ideally zero.

However this is not possible in a profession where getting back with a tale to tell or making a hole in the ground can depend on decisions made with a difference of hundredth of a second or a few meters difference in position or height.

The Western world considers acceptable an accident rate of 1 in 10,000 hours as an 'acceptable". If we can accept this figures at a face value then a simple set of "expected number of accidents " could be created by assuming the number of squadrons and assigning a certain percentage of availability and a certain number of flying hours. This would work out to about 7 aircraft per annum in the 80s and thereafter. The fact that in the tropics the aircraft is flying in a non ISA atmosphere means that the engine thrust and the lift available is lower than available to a European pilot. In addition the flying environment- the ratio of open to densely populated areas, the number and size of birds at low level can alter the accident rate in spite of identical standards of training and maintenance.

Table A .

Comparative parameters of IAF aircraft and also the Chinese FC 17
(La quite por problemas de formato, chequeen la dirección)


1. The above table gives a good insight to the problem. In the earlier days the pilot progressed through the HT 2 to the Harvard and Vampire to the Hunter. The critical parameters of Wing, power and span loadings and the aspect ratio progressed gently and even at the then top of the line aircraft the Hunter the aspect ratio was relatively modest.

As long as the Hunter was there in service a kind of de facto advanced trainer available to stream in the pilots to the tricks of "power flying". The pitch inertia figures are approximate but shows why pilots translating from the responsive Kiran would have found the MiG 21 slow to respond in pulling up or down. Criticism of the Marut and the Su-7 in terms of slow pull out after a close support run can also be found in their relatively high pitch inertias.

With the phasing out of the Hunter the pilots translated directly from the HJT 16 Kiran to the MiG 21 where the figures increased several times. The pilot had to be alert to keeping his energy levels within bounds. Whilst this was also generally managed, it meant, in a case of a mistake, the pilot was skating on thin ice.

2. The accidents were evenly distributed between seniors and rookies. Of the100 cases of accidents where the pilot is identified by name we have 36 accidents where the pilots were Squadron Leaders and above and 24 were of the level of Flight Lieutenants. Only 40 of the accident cases were below these ranks and one could ascribe inadequate experience as a cause. To note however is that 60 % of the accidents, in a sample of 100, involved senior pilots.

3 Of the 164 losses between 1962-2004 that is recorded in the Warbird of India records the main categories were:

Cause Nos Lost
Mid Air Collisions 10
Bird Strikes 10
Take Off or Landing Phase 29
Combat Related 11
No details in Public Domain rest

The numbers may appear inadequate as a statistical sample. However one has seen or dealt with an infinite sample (so beloved of statisticians!) but in practice the laws work as well for a sample of 50 as for infinity! Even if we take the first three cases ( leaving the combat losses out) it is statistically reliable. It clearly shows that accidents where that low aspect ratio was a factor ( i.e TO & landing ) dominate with 29 cases out of 49 i.e greater than 60%.

Is the general accident level too high? According to the MOD the IAF lost a total of 315 MiG 21 were lost from all causes in 40 years. Taking out the combat losses this is less than 30% of the MiG fleet in 40 years. Compared to the Canadian losses of 50% and the German Losses of 292 out of 915 F104s in a much shorter period of operation and the fact the percentage of Lightning losses for the RAF were just as high would indicate that losses were not unusual.

The figures from Warbirds of India are likely to be incomplete, especially in the pre 90s figures. However there are some statements made by the MoD that might help us. Using the figures the Warbird's loss records can be modified as follows.

The loss as recorded in the Warbirds site:

Financial Year No of Aircraft Lost
92-93 6
93-94 10
94-95 6
95-96 4
96-97 5
97-98 7
98-99 10
99-00 13
00-01 12
01-02 8

The figures would indicate that the losses from 98 to 01 are "out of control" But if we modify the figures by using some figures later given by Mr. Pillarisetti (Source: the Warbird thread quoted by Mr. Pillarisetti http://www.warbirdsofindia.com/forum/fo ... ID=59&PN=1) and the statement by the MOD about the MiG 21s lost during the period we can construct a closer model of the actual aircraft losses .

In this model the numbers "missing " in the Warbirds site with respect to the MOD statement are equally distributed into those years of the Warbirds site which showed a lower number. The actual crash figures would thus be:

Financial Year No of Aircraft Lost
92-93 11
93-94 10
94-95 11
95-96 9
96-97 10
97-98 7
98-99 10
99-00 13
00-01 12
01-02 8
02-03 11
03-04 5
04-05 2

(Thanks to Jagan Pillarisetti for this table)

Looking at the revised figures we can say that the losses whilst regrettable do not reflect any sudden decrease in quality.

There are many press reports that said that the dip in 1997-98, where only 7 were lost could be because of ACM Sareen's measures of reduced flying efforts, which was the butt of much criticism. 01-02 drop also indicates some kind of "interference". The view was that the high value for 98-99 was due to Kargil which meant extra flying and the state or readiness thereafter.

The sudden decline of crash rate après 2003, is statistically speaking, "out of control" and indicates the presence of a new factor which powerfully reduced the trend.

The reason for the crash rate as also the sudden decline in recent times can only be conjectured. The popular press mentioned everything from inadequate training (which was probably not true) to spurious engine parts from ex- Soviet Republics to combustion cans losing their enameling. None of this can be verified.

According to Western rates the loss rates should have been around 5to 7 aircraft a year but one must remember that they do not have to contend with large birds and high runway temperatures. Pilot attitudes may play a major part in accidents. "Disciplining" pilots may reduce the accident rates but break the spirit of the fighter pilot which is counterproductive. Somehow the RAF manages to maintain a balance in an understated way and one expects the IAF has its own methods.

Thoughts on Future training equipment

4. The induction of the Hawks will be warmly welcomed but judging by the parameters in table A and the above para 2. It would be unwise to expect any dramatic reduction in accident rates because of the introduction of the Hawks per se.

It is interesting to conjecture whether HAL should prepare a few IJT with a thin, low aspect ratio wing as a Mk 2 IJT. This should have a 6% wing and an aspect ratio of around 3.2 and a smaller area which would improve the thrust to weight ratio and push up the wing and span loadings but keep the same basic systems. Pilots qualifying on the IJT could then easily change to the Mk2 to extend their training envelope by flying a relatively more "snappy yet similar" machine before proceeding to the AJT.

The LCA has an unusually low aspect ratio of 1.9. It will inevitably put on weight in mid life. Unless it has been tamed by the FBW software, the LCA , will be requiring much careful handling at low speed low level flight. It is also a single engine machine. Will it repeat the MiG experience? May be but the loss of life will be less as it has a very good ejection seat.

5 The importance of having the best ejection seat possible cannot be overstated. It is noteworthy that the Pakistan Air Force retrofitted their MiG 19s with the Martin Baker MK 10. Such a seat in the MiG 21would have saved many of the 70 pilots killed. Wg.Cdr Gautam, MVC and Bar who died "dead sticking" a MiG 21 FL during take off at Lohegaon is one name, of the many, who come to mind.

6 HAL made many valiant attempts to revive the HF 24 Marut. The table does show what a good potential it has as an advanced trainer. With the same Saturn AL 55 engine possibly with an afterburner and systems aggregates as the HJT 36 and the avionics of the MiG Bison for commonality and a modest use of composites in non critical parts it is almost spot on advanced trainer cum long range strike aircraft. It has a lot of room for modern avionics. .A time to first flight of 36 months and an IOC of 54 months should be achievable. How about involving the private sector? 7. An investigation of the accidents of supersonic fighters shows the need for a twin engine configuration. Almost all the next generation combat aircraft are twins. This is no coincidence. Since fighter engines are "state of the art" ( sales jargon for "doubtful reliability") it is important to have twin engines so that the plane can get back to base. The number of Starfighters which crashed due to engine related problems is shocking to any investigator. The reported engine related failures in the MiG 21 is noteworthy.

Northrop once published a study where it was claimed that the peacetime loss rate of a twin engine fighter was one fifth of a single engine fighter. This would be true only for a very high and rigid standard of flying discipline but no doubt many of the losses are due to pure engine trouble. In the case of the MIG 21 crashes some 40-50 losses would have been avoided had the aircraft been twin engine.

8. The Chinese FC 1/FC 17 is probably the most intelligent development of the MiG 21 The lateral intake allows for a decent size of radar without obstructing forward view - something that declined with each new mark of the MiG -21. The high aspect ratio larger wing of the FC 17/ FC1would improve both low speed and combat handling as t would bleed off less energy and the lower wing loading would mean that the blistering landing speed would have been tamed to a reasonable figure. We should have had an alternative LCA project along similar lines. It is cheaper, more economical and faster to have two competing projects until a clear winner emerged.

Given the expected delay in the LCA induction the IAF could do a serious contingency study about rebuilding their time expired fleet of the MiG 21Ms. Aircraft are not like the fabled "one Horse shay" in that they don't fatigue all over at once. Life expired means usually the wings have no life left in them. Usually some 8 to 10 other components of the air frame suffer the rest are usually quite good for another 3000 hours. This would essentially mean remanufacturing the centre fuselage carry over structure and the wings and some of the empennage fittings. The RAF is "re-winging" its Hawks which is a good precedent.


1) The MiG 21 is a sound and excellently engineered design by one of the most respected design bureaus in the domain of fighter design.

2) The loss rate of the MiG 21 is in no way worse than any similar fighter of its genre and better than most.

Applying western accident rates is also somewhat unrealistic because of significant decay in thrust and lift due to high air temperatures. A 12% decrease in lift or thrust can lead to a 100% difference between crashing or getting back safe. There being no easy mathematical co-relation.

3) The design of fighters for mach 2 flight makes them difficult to handle during take off and landing. This is traditionally the most accident prone regime of flight- even in civil airliners operated by highly seasoned crews under vary benign flying conditions.

4) Statistically at least there is no conclusive evidence that poor training was a major contributor. Highly seasoned aircrews were involved in a significant number of accidents. Fighter flying is a hazardous job.

5) The ejection seat's performance left a lot to be desired. It may well have been worthwhile to develop a specifically tailored seat once the aircraft was switched to a role involving low level flights. Possibly the licensing agreements did not cover such a case.

6) The sudden decline in the crash rate of the MiG 21 après 2002 cannot be explained with the current level of published information.

7) Twin engine equipment and redundancy of systems, despite a higher first cost, may be essential in the future and may actually be economical during the life of the fleet

8) With innovative engineering the MIG 21 M and the Marut can be the basis of future equipment as a low cost supplement.

-Prodyut Das M.Tech M.Ae.S.I



The MiG philosophy of simple technology and advanced concepts

1. Some schools think of the Fighter as a showcase of technology, others differ.

The MiG Design Bureau, which set the world standard in high performance fighter design, for fifty years belonged to the second. The remarkable fact of the MiG fighters was the stead fast use of only proven ,decade old technology to achieve phenomenal performance which often the rivals equaled only by much more costly unproven and sometimes ineffective technologies.

The MIG 1/ MiG 3 used steel tube and wood structure in 1941. Despite a heavy engine it was the fastest fighter in the world with an unrivalled high altitude performance.

The MiG 15 used a ten year old centrifugal flow engine design copied from the Nene and yet it not only completely outclassed all other opponents ( Meteor, Panther etc ) having similar engines but also was a very worthy foe to the much more advanced F 86 Sabre.

The MiG 25 Foxbat used steel instead of Titanium and a simple engine that could be described as a large version of the Bristol Viper. Yet by clever but simple design of its intake system it was the fastest and highest flying fighter /interceptor/ PR aircraft for a very long time.

The MiG 29 was clearly set the standard in fighter maneuverability when it appeared yet it neither used FBW nor any composites initially.

A comparison of the design approaches of the MiG 21 and the F104

2. Of the five Mach 2 jet fighters - Draken, Lightning, Mirage III, MiG 21and the Starfighter the MiG 21 was the lightest, simplest and the most widely used. It saw combat in the Vietnam, Indo-Pak and Arab Israeli conflicts where it acquitted itself very well against much more sophisticated adversaries. A technical comparison between the MiG 21 with its adversary the Starfighter F104 A is interesting as it shows how superior packaging concepts permitted the avoidance of expensive technology.

In the F104 Starfighter was definitely the more sophisticated Aircraft. The brilliant Clarence Johnson, possibly spoilt by an abundance of technology and resources, used a combination of a 3.5% thick straight wing with a state of the art J 79c engine wit a 17 stage compressor giving a pressure ratio of 12. The 3.5 % thick wing required CNC milling which was cutting edge technology in 1950s. The wing was cutting edge in a literal sense also. On the ground the leading edge had to be capped to prevent damage and injury. Interestingly the intake was fixed geometry which meant that the intake was inefficient at off design conditions. The tyres, which could not be fitted into the thin wings were of extra high pressure and had to be fitted into a narrow track fuselage mounted undercarriage. The ejection seat was of a downward ejection type which must have been unnerving. The fact that the wings were almost solid meant that all the fuel was carried in the fuselage. This must have lengthened the fuselage considerably increasing its pitch inertia.

The MiG 21 team chose the innovative tailed delta concept. Initially derided by the West it was proved to be the best solution for the supersonic combat role. It combined lowest wave drag and yet avoided the problem of high induced drag of the pure delta which had to use "up" elevon" resulting in loss of lift during take off or a turn. Engineering wise the Delta plan form of the tailed delta meant a reasonably thick wing which could be manufactured by traditional sheet and rivet methods.

The engine compressor had only six stages but two spool technology (first used in the Daimler Benz ZKL in 1944 !) allowed a pressure ratio of 9. This combined with a conceptually sophisticated but engineering-wise simple translating intake cone allowed better ram pressure recovery. With typical MiG Bureau simplicity the cone was three position rather than being continuously variable. The overall pressure ratio was thus pretty close to the F104s but the fewer engine stages meant a much cheaper and lighter engine.

The MiG 21 is till date the lowest powered Mach 2 interceptor in service despite a profusion of bulges and scoops and having mushroom head rivets towards the rear.

The undercarriage was a brilliant design which allowed a wide track undercarriage with low pressure tyres for ease of ground handling. The ejection seat not only equaled the performance of the contemporary seat but the semi encapsulating feature gave an outstanding protection for high speed bailout Unlike many of its contemporaries all systems were duplicated.

The MiG 21 went on to successful service with both large and small, relatively obscure and new air forces which speaks well of its serviceability and reliability.

Whenever used in combat (Indo-Pak, Vietnam and Yom Kippur) the MiG 21was a very respected opponents to warplanes several times more expensive. Pakistan lost 3 Starfighters to the MiG 21 in 71 and the Israeli Air Forces had greater respect for the MiG 21 in the Yom Kippur war. The F4s and Mirage 3s usually avoided dog fights with the MiG-21.

Western Industry found the selling price of a MiG 21 unbelievably low and politically motivated but sheer good engineering and ruthless standardization kept prices down. Low prices led to mass production. If prices were indeed subsidized the amount would not be as much as is made out to be.


References and acknowledgment;

This is to thank Jagan Pillarisetti of Bharat Rakshak and Warbirds of India for allowing me to use the data on his Warbirds site as well as supplementing the data with further information and comments.

Wg. Cdr. Sekaran ( Retd) of MOFTU for his inputs in discussing the accidents listed in the Warbirds of India site.

The reader is also directed to search the following websites through any search engine. I used Google.

Bharat Rakshak
Warbirds of India
Greg Goebels website on Fighter aircraft
- Starfighter for Starfighter losses and operational history
Encyclopedia of Fighters Gunston for basic details of the Aircraft.
Air International
Air Forces Monthly
mentions that a total of 315 MiG-21s were lost in about forty years - Oct 63 to end of July 2003 The MOD also stated that between April 1992 to March 2002 , a total of 102 MiG-21s were lost in accidents and 39 Pilots killed. We have records of 81 of these Mig-21 mishaps.
The opinions expressed in this piece are personal and do not reflect the opinion or policies of the organization I am currently employed in.

Y este otro:



The Indian Air Force's (IAF) flight safety record has come in for much criticism lately. The press have called into question the IAF's ability to adequately carry out tasks assigned to it in light of a recent spate of accidents. "Experts" both in India and abroad have gone so far as to claim that the rate at which the IAF was flying itself into the ground, Pakistan would simply have to wait for the IAF to crash its entire fleet before obtaining air superiority. However, these "expert" opinions on IAF attrition in the 1990s are problematic in that they view IAF flight safety in isolation, both temporally and with respect to its principal adversary. Briefly, IAF attrition rates in the 1990s are half of they were in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet in neither of those decades was the IAF's operational capabilities compromised. More importantly, no one seems to have bothered to situate the IAF's attrition rate (and operational capabilities) in a comparative perspective. More precisely, if the IAF is flying itself into the ground what is happening with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)?

In one sense this unbalanced perception aptly exemplifies the paradox in the kinds of information available on South Asia’s two major Air Arms. Furthermore, it highlights the differing political constraints under which the armed forces in India and Pakistan operate. Since the 1960s the PAF has published three official histories and has vigorously promoted a positive uncritical image of itself, often exaggerating its achievements and capabilities vis-à-vis the IAF. The IAF has, until recently, been shy of any publicity and has yet to publish an official history. Yet keen students of both air forces find that there is a greater volume of detailed meaningful open source literature available on the IAF than on its adversary. This is in great part due to the fact that the IAF is subject to both legislative and administrative oversight. The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Defence and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India provide detailed (and often unflattering) audits of the IAF’s operations which cover everything from attrition to procurement decisions. More importantly, the auditors’ reports are unclassified and available to anyone interested. The PAF, however, is not subject to public audit.

The publication of a recent article on PAF attrition by the semi-official Pakistan Institute of Air Defence Studies (PIADS) is therefore heaven sent. The article Air Accidents Inspite of High Efficiency by Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmad Khan (PAF) allows one a rare glimpse into the flight safety record of the Pakistan Air Force, and more importantly it helps to put the IAF’s attrition rate in perspective. Although Air Forces Monthly’s page on attrition does a fairly good job of covering accidents in the subcontinent, given the lack of oversight in Pakistan, usually only accidents that occur in built up areas or near population centers are reported. A snapshot of attrition rates for the two airforces covering the 1990s demonstrates that the myth of the PAF's superior safety record is just that: a myth.

The following figures are given by Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmad Khan in the PIADS article.

Annual Attrition Rates – Pakistan Air Force (expressed per 10,000 hours)

Year Attrition Rate
1991/92 1.89
1992/93 1.11
1993/94 1.41
1994/95 1.23
1995/96 1.32
1996/97 1.25
1997/98 1.40

Unfortunately, Air Marshal Khan doesn’t provide a breakdown of the actual number of accidents and flying hours for each of these years. Since we have no information with which to assign weights to the annual averages in order to come up with a figure for the period 1991-1997, we are forced to use a simple average. This works out to an attrition rate of 1.37 per 10,000 hours over the entire period.

In the case of the IAF we can draw on figures for annual flying hours from the CAG reports between 1992 and 1998, and the 1998 Report of the Kalam Committee on Air Safety to arrive at a clear picture of IAF attrition over the period 1991/92-1996/97. The figures for 1997/98 amd 1998/99 are based on the Minister of Defence's written replies to Parliment in August 1999.

Annual Flying hours: IAF

Year Flying Hours

1991/92 256,200
1992/93 238,362
1993/94 238,362
1994/95 252,822
1995/96 268,385
1996/97 275,505
1997/98 306,190

Total Flying Hours 1991/92-1997/98: 1,836,875

During this period the IAF suffered a total of 194 accidents. Of these 154 aircraft were declared "beyond economical repair". If one uses the higher former figure to calculate IAF attrition, it works out to 1.07 per 10,000 hours. If one only includes write-offs, attrition falls off to 0.83 per 10,000 hours. Both figures for the IAF are lower than the lowest possible attrition rate for the PAF during the entire period based on a weighted average of their annual attrition rates.

Furthermore Air Marshal Khan writes that in a 19 month period from January 1997 (i.e. up to 31 July 1998) the PAF flew 110,000 hours and suffered 11 major accidents. An attrition rate of 1 per 10,000 hours.

While we do not know the exact number of flying hours for the IAF in that 19 month period we can use flying hours from the years 1997-1998 to 1998-1999 to come up a with a reasonable estimate. In 1997/98 the IAF logged 306,190 hours and in 1998/99 it logged 311,412 hours. For the sake of argument we can extrapolate that the IAF logged 181,657 hours during the first 7 months of 1998. Hence for the 19 month period beginning Jan 1997 the IAF logged a total 487,847 hours. During this period the IAF suffered 16 major accidents (7 in 1997 + 9 in first seven months of 1998). This translates into a loss rate of 0.32 per 10,000 hours. Thus as IAF, as a service, suffered an attrition rate that is less than a third of the Pakistan Air Force's during 1997-1998.

However, the figures do not adequately capture the attrition rates for fighters during the same period. Given the IAF’s almost transcontinental responsibilities, the IAF flies large numbers of helicopters and transport aircraft. For this reason attrition rates for the service as a whole don’t adequately reflect flight safety in the combat (fighter/fighter-trainer) elements of the two air arms.

The Pakistan Air Force has traditionally had a large fighter component. For most of the 1990s the ratio of the fighters/fighter-trainers to transports/helicopters in the PAF has been approximately 85:15. Unfortunately, Air Marshal Khan provides no breakdown of flying hours by type for the PAF. Let us, therefore, over-estimate the number of hours that that PAF fighters put in during the 19 month period from January 1997 (and thereby introduce a bias that favors the PAF), so that they are allotted 90% of the flying hours. This works out to 99,000 hours. Furthermore, Air Marshal Khan says:

"The PAF accident rate for 1997 till August 98 was 1 aircraft per 10,000 flying hours, and is a tribute to the high expertise and dedication of technicians, engineers and professional excellence of PAF fighter pilots. "

This would indicate that the 11 losses (all write-offs) were indeed all fighters. However, since this is not conclusive let us use a lower figure. We know with certainty that the PAF lost 7 fighters (4 F-7s, 1 Mirage III, 1 A-5, 1 F-6) during this period. Based on this figure the PAF's fighter attrition rate for the 19 month period works out to 0.70. If we use an attrition rate which represents attrition in the same ratio as hours flown by fighters (i.e. 9 fighter losses), the figure is a corresponding 0.90 per 10,000 hours.

Now let us turn to the IAF. The IAF's fleet breakdown (fighters vs. others) is approximately 60:40. However, we know that 50% of the IAF flying hours in 1997/98, or 153,000 hours, were contributed by fighters. Based on this, it is not unreasonable to assume that 50% of the hours, or 90,708 hours, during the first 7 months of 1998 would have been put in by fighters. This means that the fighters logged up about 243,708 flying hours during this 19 month period. Over this period the IAF lost 3 fighters in 1997 (2 MiG-21, 1 MiG-27) and 8 fighters (6 MiG-21, 1 MiG-23, 1 MiG-29) during the first seven months of 1998. This means that the loss rate for Indian fighters was 0.45 per 10,000 hours.

Regardless of what figure we use to calculate the PAF's losses, it seems that that IAF fighters suffered from lower levels of attrition. Of course the IAF’s high attrition rate remains a matter of concern. The MiG-21 fleet (esp. the FL, M, U, UM and US variants) is the main source of this problem. Given that these aircraft are well past their (manufacturer recommended) airframe lives and that the IAF pushes them to their limits, until new Advanced Jet Trainers are procured these aircraft will continue to be a source of grief for the IAF. Nevertheless, in the future, students of South Asian air arms would do well to remember that if the IAF is ‘falling out of the sky’, it is doing so less rapidly than its main adversary.

Fuente: -


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Mensaje por pit »

Los hindúes sostuvieron intercambios con los Thailandeses, pilotos de F-16 thais fueron a la India a volar Su-30MKI y sus homologos hindúes viceversa. Miren lo que opinaron los Thais del Su-30MKI:

Su-30MKI impressive, say Thai pilots
Thailand's Air Force pilots, who flew India's Sukhoi 30 supersonic fighters (Su-30MKI) at Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh early this week, have found the multi-role fighters excellent with good manoeuvrability and performance.

Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) F-16 Squadron Commander Wg Cdr Manat Chuanprayoon told reporters here today that the impressive Su-30's had good manoeuvrability and performance when they flew them for the first time at Air Force station at Bareilly.

Chuanprayoon said Thailand, whose airforce has about 80 American made F-16 fighters, is evaluating the option of buying the Russian-made fighters with the thrust vector engine, the only such aircraft in the world.

A delegation of 15 RTAF pilots visited the Bangalore-based Aircraft and System Testing Establishment (ASTE), one of the five such centres in the world, for an interaction with Indian test pilots and engineers.

The Thai pilots are in India as part of the exchange programme with the Royal Thai Air Force in preparation for joint exercises that the IAF and the Thai Air Force are planning.

"The crew for the exercises are familiarising one another with the language and practices for joint manoeuvres," officials said.

ASTE Chief Test Pilot Group Captain, P P Reddy said the Indian pilots flew the F-16 aircraft at Thailand in operational conditions.

The Thai F-16s, he said, were more advanced than the ones possessed by Pakistan.

Los pilotos hindúes también se montaran en F-16 Thais:

Indian pilots to fly F-16s in Thailand:-
New Delhi | April 27, 2005 8:43:23 PM IST

New Delhi, April 27 : Indian Air Force (IAF) pilots will fly in F-16 jets of the Royal Thai Air Force as part of an exchange programme aimed at boosting defence cooperation between the two countries.

The move comes at a time when the US is aggressively pushing the F-16 and F-18 jets for an Indian plan to buy 126 frontline jets to modernise its air force.

As part of the exchange programme, Thai pilots that are part of a 15-member delegation currently visiting India flew in the IAF's frontline Su-30 jets Tuesday and Wednesday at Bareilly, said spokesman Squadron Leader Mahesh Upasani.

"This is the first time we have allowed foreign pilots to fly in the Su-30s," Upasani told IANS, noting the Thai pilots will fly along with their IAF counterparts in the two-seat multi-role combat planes.

A 10-member IAF team led by Group Captain R.D. Mathur that is currently in Thailand would fly in that country's F-16 jets. The team comprises officers of the flying, technical and logistics branches and will visit various airbases and formations in Thailand.

"The visits are stepping stones in defence cooperation between the two air forces," said Upasani.

"The teams are expected to understand each other's working ethos and culture. These visits provide a unique opportunity to fly aircraft which are not part of their inventory."

The Thai delegation arrived here Monday on a weeklong visit to India as part of new annual exchange programme between the two countries. It is led by Group Captain Poramate Katekovit.

The team will visit the IAF's Air Defence College at Lucknow and transport squadrons at the Agra airbase, which is home to the force's Il-78 air-to-air refuelling aircraft.

The Thai team will travel to Bangalore Thursday to visit the Aircraft System Testing Establishment and state-run Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. It will leave for Bangkok Friday.

Este año será MUY ocupado para los pilotos hindues de Su-30MKI, con ejercicios conjuntos con HHA (Israel, con los F-16I Sufa), con la AdA (Ejercicio Garuda II en Francia con los Mirage 2000-5F), con la USAF (Cope India 2005 con F-16C y F-15C), y aparte este intercambio....


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Mensaje por pit »

Que opinan los pilotos hindues de sus MiG-29 y como los comparan con los F-16A de la PAF?

"Balderash" (el nickname para Shah Saman Bikram, Teniente de Vuelo retirado de la IAF) opina esto:

In a 1980s Indo-Pak context, we need to clear what the overall scenario is. Otherwise any `one on one' discussion tends to be devoid of context and largely academic (eg. if one side has an E-3, the other side is probably dead meat, irrespective of whether it is the MiG-29/F-16 operator).

1) Fairly small area of operations- compared to the ranges involved in say Western Europe, Indian and Pakistani bases tend to be pretty (some say, uncomfortably) close. So range/endurance, while still of course important, are not as critical as one may expect.

2)Lack of AWACS- neither side had (or still does have) AWACS. That combined with a far from full ground based radar coverage would mean that any engagement would largely depend on either GCI or on the fighter's radar itself.

3) What is the tactical scenarion? Seldom will two planes take off and meet one on one for a `joust'. There has to be a tactical context. In a 1980s Indo-Pak scenario, the most likely tactical contexts are:
a) PAF F-16s defending against an IAF strike (MiG-27/Jaguars) escorted by MiG-29s
b) MiG-29s defending against HVA strikes by F-16s (say against a target like the Bombay High Oil fields)

This is simply because given the relatively limited number of F-16s, PAF doctrine calls for it to be used only for defence of very high value targets (eg. CAP near Sargodha) or in a strike role, attack on strategic/HVA targets. You won't find an F-16 hunting tanks over the Thar. So that in itself sets some context to where these two planes could reasonably meet.

I could go on and on to make the scenario even more specific- but even working with these, both sides would be actively looking for each other (given the two tactical scenarios above). The MiG-29A would have a `first look' advantage given greater radar detection range. But I would not overstate the role of BVR- from all I hear and know, the early R-27 is as good/bad as a late model Sparrow- its certainly no AMRAAM/R-77. SO while the MiG-29 would get off a first shot (and that may well be decisive, in terms of scattering an attacking force- as I said it all depends on the scenario)- if both sides press the attack, and the numbers (hey another variable- rarely will you have one on ones) are roughly equal- it will come down to a dogfight.

I think the F-16/MiG-29 close combat debate is well chronicled in books/on the Net, and many of you would be aware of the factors involved, the HMCS/R-73 advantage of the MiG, the better allround visibility of the F-16, better low speed turning of the MiG etc etc. So I won't belabor the points, instead some anecdotes may help bring in something new/fresh:

1) I have never flown in or faced a MiG-29, but I have had extensive time on the Mirage 2000- so I have some context for this story. In IAF DACM, the MiG-29 consistently wins 7 times out of 10 v/s the Mirage 2000. The HMCS/73 combo is indeed deadly, especially for an adversary who does not train specifically to defeat it- anyone playing by the `usual rules' will quickly be dead. The ratios improved a bit, but not greatly, once the IAF began integrating R-73s on Mirage 2000s- that decision in itself was led to a large extent to early experiences in DACM which showed the R-73 to be a formidable weapon- easily outclassing the R-60/Magic then in IAF service.

2) At least on the Mirage 2000, doctrine was to play to the aircraft's strengths- the Mirage also has a `first look/first shot' advantage and better handling at higher speeds. Hence, esp with the R-73 integrated, the doctrine called for was to get the Super-530Ds off at BVR, and if that did not end the engagement, use high speed, slashing attacks using the wide engagement envelope (and indeed pretty robust range) of the R-73 v/s getting into a slow knife fight, where the F-16 has the advantage. One specific trick was to loose the Super 530D at say 25-30kms and then quickly follow it with a R-73 (which with its range makes this possible)- kinda like the old Soviet tactic of firing an SARH and IR missile together. Makes life very difficult for the other guy. From what I know, this tactic works to a large extent (if it works against the Israelis, it should work against the PAF).

3) One of the advantages of being old is that you tend to get to know both sides of the story. I know several ex-PAF pilots, including some F-16 jocks. The PAF of course worked hard at evading that almost inevitable first BVR shot. Ranging from old fashioned chaff/evasive manouvers to `beam manouvers' to break radar lock, based on known characteristics of IAF radars. Woudl they have worked 100% of the time- have no idea. In close combat, they were much more confident of holding their own- but were always worried about the R-73. I have in fact had the occasion to fly an F-16 a few times (in a `friendly' country)- and I can say that in a low speed manouvering fight, it would handily take on a Mirage 2000, esp as the delta bleeds speed and energy more in a sustained turnign fight. But if the Mirage pilot can play to his strengths, its a level playing field.

Y mas:

The MiG-29 is like any other fighter- it has its positives and it has its negatives. Net, its not a super-fighter that will rip through anything you throw at it, nor is it a piece of junk. But handled properly, it can be a deadly adversary. First, let me try and adress some of the questions raised in this thread.

BVR capability of the MiG-29- The Mig-29A had an admittedly primitive system- the issue was more the pilot interfaces than the missiles or radar in themselves. The R-27 wasn’t a world beater but was as good as a late model Sparrow- but the problem was the pilot needed to flip some 11 swtiches to fire a missile, and the missile tracking system for BVR was really primitive (in fact the same as late model MiG-23MFs)- the pilot had a small clock in front of him- which would help him estimate how long the missile would take to fly to the target and ie. How long he would need to maintain radar lock. This is a primitive system, no doubt- and far behind the systems then in place of top Western fighters like the F-15. This has been tremendously improved since then- remember the MiG-29A is now a part of history- so talking about its failings to judge current Fulcrums in service with decent air forces isn’t really fair. Today’s Fulcrums are far evolved in the BVR scenario- with the ability to track and lock onto up to 2 targets at one time, and guide R-27s to both. And this isn’t even the SMT upgrade we’re talking about. Net, yes when it started out, the Fulcrum was limited in the BVR arena (but heck the F-16A didn’t even have BVR capability), but now that is no longer reality. Also, before trashing the early Mig-29s BVR, we should understand the tactical environment it was designed to operate in- strict GCI control and with huge jamming support- ie the pilot would be vectored to an optimum launch point, fire and come home. It may well have performed reasonably in such an environment- in any western or quasi-western air force, this is quite useless, hence the modifications made to the Fulcrum since its early days.

WVR capability- I cannot begin the understand the criticism of the Fulcrum in the WVR arena- its a tremendous close in fighter, Even discounting the HCS (for it is technically a Helment Mounted Cueing System- NOT a HMS), the Fulcrum has excellent WVR weapons- the R-73 is better than almost all other WVR weapons in mass service, and the Fulcrum is very agile. So the Fulcrum is clearly not to be criticized in the WVR arena- in simulated close combats in the IAF, the Fulcrum regularly had the Mirage 2000 for lunch and spat it out. As for criticisms of the HCS, perhaps the original poster did not read Jon Lake’s book closely enough- otherwise the words `Schlemm’ may have more meaning to him!

Comparision to other fighters- comparisons are always odious- as without a context, they mean nothing. So, is a Mig-29 good enough to meet likely adversaries- the answer is `it depends’. For the IAF, the Fulcrum is more than enough for likely adversaries- limited numbers of F-16A with no BVR, and F-7/Mirage III for the PAF, and very limited numbers of poorly flown Su-27 and large numbers of F-6/7 for the PLAAF. But for Serbia and Iraq, it clearly wasn’t good enough as they were up against large numbers of excellently flown F-15s with AWACS support, while the Fulcrums were poorly maintained, and without AWACS or even effective GCI support (as the ground air defence environment had been severely degraded by NATO strikes).


I have never flown in a Fulcrum- though at the fag end of my career, I did fly the Mirage 2000. But from what my friends tell me, the Fulcrum is an awesome weapons system to have in one's inventory- in WVR combat, it has no match whatsoever in the IAF inventory, and even in the BVR arena, the IAF has greater faith in the R-27 vs the Super 530.


Si la opinión de un veterano piloto de la IAF, con experiencia de guerra y que voló tanto en el MiG-21FL como en el Mirage-2000H es interesante...¿Que tiene que decir un piloto de la PAF de todo esto?

Es mas interesante aún!:

Hi everyone.

I've now browsed a lot of the old discussions on this forum and two obervations:
1. Some members are extremely civil and well informed. Tom, Arthur, Balderdash among others come to mind. But some jump on any comment viciously- just be gentle- this is my firts substantive post.
2. I gather that some members are also pilots or ex-pilots (Balderdash being a notable and ironic case- perhaps some day we trained to fly against each other!).

My observations on the MiG-29- and before some of my Pakistani friends on this forum jump on me-
1) These are my personal opinions- they are free to have their own
2) I'm not exactly giving out state secrets- these are well known to those who need to know

The MiG-29 is a far more deadly beast than the original poster makes it out to be, and having trained to fly against it, I have the utmost respect for it. In close combat, at slow speeds, it has a distinct advantage in turn rate v.s an F-16 (at higher speeds, the advantage turns to the Falcon), and while its BVR suite isn't perfect- it was a distinct cause for worry- as most PAF planes had no credible BVR. So a first shot advantage always helps. I think the Fulcrum is certainly not unbeatable, but is an opponent worthy of respect. And that my friends is what any real pilot will tell you- the swagger and `one of ours is equal to 10 of yours' bull**** is something for teenagers or armchair generals- if you want to train to beat someone- you have to respect it first. And the Fulcrum commands a hell of a lot of respect. Would be happy to discuss any specific aspect in detail.

Y mas:
As for my antecedents, I joined the PAF in 1973 and retired due to health reasons in 1992. In that period, I had the good fortune to fly in both the no 9 and 11 squadrons, and at the height of the Afghan war, they were interesting places to be!


This topic is beginning to digress from the original discussion on the Fulcrum, and at the risk of having some of the immature elements jump in with their vitriol and fire and brimstone, let me attempt to answer some topics raised.

How does the PAF pilot view his IAF counterpart? The answer to this is simple- with the highest respect. Let me give some background- both the PAF and IAF, like any other air force have a mix of average pilots, not so great pilots, and some genuinely gifted pilots, who would be an asset to any air force. In my experience what sets these `aces’ apart is not brains, brawn or nationality- but what can be loosely termed as `situational awareness’- in a plane, they just seem to process more and faster than others what is happening around them- leading to better instincts- and often the difference between being the killer and being killed. To be brutally honest- I (and most of my PAF brethren) firmly believe that the percentage split of these types of pilots is not greatly different between the PAF and IAF. So in terms of overall fighter pilot skill, there isn’t a world of difference. BUT- the IAF has a much larger fleet, and over twice as many pilots. So in absolute terms, the IAF has more mediocre and average pilots than the PAF (as it does more `aces’). Now combine this with doctrine - the PAF vis a vis the IAF has a more defensive doctrine ie. .maintain air superiority over Pakistani soil and selective CAS - not because the PAF is made of `dogfighting jocks’ as some on this forum have alluded- but due to the harsh reality that the PAF is MUCH smaller than the IAF and has to be more selective about what it does. Now where do the top notch IAF fighter pilots go- the MiG-29 and Mirage-2000. The top PAF pilots go to the F-16 and some limited Mirage squadrons. Given the difference in doctrines- any future war will definitely see the IAF mounting a much higher % of CAS and interdiction sorties carried out by MiG-27s, Jaguars, MiG-23BNs, while the PAF % of strike sorties will be much lower. So the chances of a top notch PAF pilot chancing on an IAF MiG-23/27/Jaguar piloted by a less than top notch IAF pilot are higher than a top IAF pilot in a Fulcrum/Mirage 2000 chancing upon a less than top noth PAF pilot flying strike missions in say an A-5. This has also been the pattern in past wars- many IAF losses were due to their strike missions (Hunters, Mysteres, Su-7s) being intercepted by the cream of the PAF in F-86s/F-104. So in both 1965 and 1971, overall air to air scores were somewhat in favour of the PAF- also given the higher % of strike missions, losses to ground fire are also likely to be higher for the IAF. Mind you- the kill to loss ratios were nothing like 3-1 or 6-1 as some overenthusiastic folks claim. In 1965, the PAF killed some 25-30 IAF jets in air combat, and lost 18-20 of its own for example. But when the top pilots of both sides met in air combat- the results were flat even. Ask Balderdash or other pilots who flew the MiG-21 in 1971 (where they admittedly bettered our F-104s). I seem to have rambled on a lot- but to summarize in a future war, the air to air score may well be slightly in favor of the PAF- not due to any superhuman superiority of its pilots- but due to the reasons highlighted above. But when a PAF pilot in an F-16 faces an IAF MiG-29, he knows it will all come down to his tactics and luck on that day- as pilot skills are likely to be dead even- and I suspect the IAF views it exactly the same way.

BVR tactics- the PAF has the Matra 530 in its fleet since 71- but this is an admittedly limited missile. As for the IAF, I do believe they assume the PAF to have limited Sparrow capability. Good on them :-)

How does the PAF plan to use its F-16s- certainly not hunting tanks in the Thar- there are too few of them going around and they are too valuable to use on a mission for which many other jets in the fleet are adequate. Without going into specific deployments- the Falcon would be used for the most high-stake missions- air defence of critical installations and bases (anyone trying to attack Sagordha better have nerves of steel) and of course nuclear strike.

Y por siacaso se aburrieron (de verdad?), aca hay mas:

Net,the PAF hasn't been having the best of times since the late 80s with sanctions, lack of new equipment etc. It has done a great job with the resources at hand in getting upgraded Mirages and maintaining the current fleet in top shape. But with the induction of the Su-30 in large numbers, there will begin to be a distinct qualitative mismatch between the IAF and PAF. The FC-1 is the current great white hope- but personally I think the PAF needs to look at alternatives as well. Given the current resource crunch thats easier said than done. Some options that might be worthwhile to look at- BVR upgrades for the F-7 fleet- much like teh MiG-21-93, Getting the Super 530 for the upgraded Mirages (some reports in fact suggest this is happening). These will at least ensure a decent BVR capability for the bulk of the air force.

As to WVR v/s BVR emphasis- the PAF has a more balanced training than what you say suggests- a lot of training is imparted in BVR tactics- if only to teach the bulk of pilots how to evade BVR shots in order to close in with BVR equipped enemy fighters.

Y yo digo:

(cuando el foro de AFM estaba repleto de verdaderos "insiders"!)

Espero no haberlos aburrido!

Aca la ficha personal de Balderash



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Mensaje por alejandro_ »


Excelente informacion (como siempre). Ahora no puedo postear nada porque no estoy en casa, a ver si mañana...


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Mensaje por Nighthawk »

"Experts" both in India and abroad have gone so far as to claim that the rate at which the IAF was flying itself into the ground, Pakistan would simply have to wait for the IAF to crash its entire fleet before obtaining air superiority.

¡Que sentido del humor tienen estos "expertos"!.......... jajajaja :yelro:

Excelentes artículos Pit. Aclaran mucha la situación de los accidentes en la IAF -sobre todo con los MiG-21- y en cierta forma ponen en duda las cifras dadas por los pakistaníes sobre sus propios accidentes.


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Mensaje por rafael »

Excelente pit como siempre con tus buenos post .

ahora se tiene mas claridad del asunto de los acidentes en la fuerza a erea india



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Ejercicio IAF vs USAF

Mensaje por Halifax »

Antes que nada saludos!

La semana pasada lei en una revista no recuerdo si Aviation Week o Flight que en el proximo ejercicio entre la IAF y la USAF esta ultima concurriria con F-16, ya que estan tratando de venderselos a la IAF como reemplazo de sus MiG-21, si no me equivoco el pedido es de como 140 aviones. Creo que por la IAF van a participar los Su-30, Mirage2000 y los MiG-27. Saludos!

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Mensaje por renatenko »

El promedio de accidentes aéreos de Fuerza aérea hindú, esta en los parámetros normales o es muy suceptible a los accidente?

No se si en la fuerza aérea China ocurra accidentes de su fuerza aérea con bastante frecuencia ?????? :?: :?:

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Mensaje por jancarloalvares »

algun portaaviones?..y si lo hay con que aviones cuenta?... :shock:

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Mensaje por faust »

jajajaj PIT, de verdad que no me importa mucho si se caen o no los aviones indios, realmente el que vuelen es contrario a la naturaleza, asi que se cumplan las leyes naturales, no me preocupa...

lo que si me parece ultra interesantisimo, es el analisis sobre los aviones y sus tactitas, donde realmente se demuetra como se deberia analizar una situacion potencialmente conflictiva....

importa tanto el que avion o sistema de arma es mejor como la doctrina tactica es empleada, descartando el factor humano, importante siempre en todo esto...

el analisis me confirma que no estpoy muy lejos de la "imagen" tactica de un enfrentamiento "A" Vs "B"

el hecho de disponer la IAF mig-29 escortando Mig-27/jaguar contra F-16 pone en una situacion delicada a estos ultimos

el usar aviones en misiones multirol sin escorta y autodefenderse como pretenden los pakistanies, contra una defensa de mig-29, pondrian de nuevo estos en una situacion bastante delicada... no me gustaria ser un viperdriver en pakistan....

me encantó esta frase:

if you want to train to beat someone- you have to respect it first.

jajaja asi pienso de cualquier adversario....

incluso de J-6s chinos

eso es una maxima que cualquier piloto deberia tatuarse en la mano derecha

oye PIT, por que no hacemos una especie de "Boelcke diktat" moderno???

pienso que solo 2 o 3 "diktat" pueden ser rescatados, pero creo que hay que agregarle otros mas efectivos, hay muchos de galland, marseille, bong y otros que puede servir :wink:

este deberia ser el primero :wink:

"El que no es tolerante con la intolerancia, es un intolerante"
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Mensaje por blad »

Leyendo en las redes internacionales (internet) capte que la india queria comprarle el unico portaaviones a Rusia y arrendarle un submarnino nuclear espero que eso no ocurra nunca.
Ojala que la india se de cuenta que esta primero y tambien ba pakistan.

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Mensaje por Fonzie »

Parece que Rusia ofrecera a India el nuevo modelo de Mig-29 con toberas vectoriales denominado MIG-35.

Russia to field latest MiG-35 in India tender

ZHUKOVSKY (Online) - Russia is to field its latest nuclear capable MiG-35 fighter against US F-16 and French Mirage2000 in the tender to be floated for the acquisition of 125 aircraft for the Indian Air Force to replace its ageing MiG-21 fleet, a top Russian official said.

“We will offer our MiG-35 multiple fighters with thrust vectoring control along with transfer of technology for indigenous production in India,” Director General and Chief Designer of Russian Aircraft Corporation (RAC) ‘MiG’ Alexei Fedorov said after display of its capabilities by “MiG-29OVT” at the air show here.

Talking to PTI on the sidelines of the international aerospace show MAKS-2205, Fedorov said it has been decided to market the MiG-29OVT with thrust vectoring control (TVC) under the MiG-35 brand.

“It has incorporated all the features of MiG-29M/M2 fighters developed on the basis of MiG-29 frontline fighter and today we can offer top-of-the-line multiple combat aircraft with in-flight refuelling,” Fedorov said.
Fedorov was appointed RAC MiG Director General by the Russian government last year after he successfully executed Sukhoi Su-30MKI deal with India as the President of Irkut Corporation manufacturer of Su-30MKI.

According to MiG Deputy Chief Designer Andrei Karasyov MiG-35 is capable of delivering all present and future weapons, since it has universal open architecture.

“It would take not more than 60 flights for the Indian pilots to master the new fighter with thrust vectoring,” Chief Test Pilot of RAC MiG Pavel Vlasov said after displaying the capabilities of the new aircraft.
“Today new MiG fighter has the super -manoeuvrability similar to Sukhoi 30MKI,” he underscored.

De la prensa de Pakistan

ZHUKOVSKY (Russia): Russia is to field its latest nuclear capable MiG-35 fighter against US F-16 and French Mirage2000 in the tender to be floated for the acquisition of 125 aircraft for the Indian Air Force to replace its ageing MiG-21 fleet, a top Russian official said.

"We will offer our MiG-35 multirole fighters with thrust vectoring control along with transfer of technology for indigenous production in India," Director General and Chief Designer of Russian Aircraft Corporation (RAC) 'MiG' Alexei Fedorov said after display of its capabilities by "MiG-29OVT" at the air show here.

Talking to PTI on the sidelines of the international aerospace show MAKS-2205, Fedorov said it has been decided to market the MiG-29OVT with thrust vectoring control (TVC) under the MiG-35 brand. "It has incorporated all the features of MiG-29M/M2 fighters developed on the basis of MiG-29 frontline fighter and today we can offer top-of-the-line multirole combat aircraft with in-flight refuelling," Fedorov said.

Fedorov was appointed RAC MiG Director General by the Russian government last year after he successfully executed Sukhoi Su-30MKI deal with India as the President of Irkut Corporation manufacturer of Su-30MKI.

According to MiG Deputy Chief Designer Andrei Karasyov MiG-35 is capable of delivering all present and future weapons, since it has universal open architecture.

"It would take not more than 60 flights for the Indian pilots to master the new fighter with thrust vectoring," Chief Test Pilot of RAC MiG Pavel Vlasov said after displaying the capabilities of the new aircraft.

"Today new MiG fighter has the super -maneuverability similar to Sukhoi 30MKI," he underscored.


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Mensaje por Ave_Negra »

Parece que las relaciones entre indios y yonies van viento en popa!!!:

U.S., Indian air forces continue building relationship

9/15/2005 - MISAWA AIR BASE, Japan (AFPN) -- U.S. and Indian air forces took the latest step in their growing relationship recently when six Indian Airmen were here for a weeklong visit, while two U.S. Airmen visited their counterparts in India.

Two Indian pilots, two air traffic controllers and two safety officers spent time learning about Misawa’s day-to-day operations, including flying, maintenance, air traffic and crash recovery. Besides flying in the F-16 Fighting Falcon, they interfaced with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.

Meanwhile, as the Indian contingent was here, two 13th Fighter Squadron Airmen traveled from here to India, and according to one of the Indian officers, :!: they flew in a Russian-made SU-30 fighter jet :!:.

These exchange visits were in preparation for a Cope India exercise in November, which will include about 250 U.S. Airmen from bases in the Pacific. Besides Misawa, Airmen will come from nearby Kadena and Yokota Air Bases, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, and Andersen AFB, Guam.

“A big part of it is so they have familiarity on how we operate, so we can safely operate together during the exercise, as well as (build) rapport and friendships that will make the exercise successful,” said Lt. Col. Chuck Toplikar, 13th FS operations director here.

The bilateral exercise will be the second in India in less than two years. In February 2004, about 150 Airmen from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, took part in the biggest exercise between the two countries in their shared training history.

Another step forward in the continuing India-U.S. relationship took place in June when representatives from the Indian military observed the Cope Thunder exercise in Alaska.

“One of our jobs, in this large area of operation, is to find an opportunity to engage our friends and partners and to work with them,” said Gen. Paul V. Hester, Pacific Air Forces commander. “Unlike the European theater where NATO collects a group of nations together under one umbrella and operates together in that cooperation, we do bilateral cooperation in the Pacific.”

Exercises such as Cope India “build trust and cooperation so that we can work together when coalitions are necessary in the Pacific,” General Hester said.

This fall’s Cope India, featuring F-16s from Misawa and E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control systems from Kadena will be a “large force exercise,” General Hester said.

“We’ll have people on the ground and people in the air,” he said. “It will mark a growing respect between our two nations.”


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Registrado: 12 Sep 2005, 22:52

Mensaje por jashugun »

Una duda, en el texto se menciona la capacidad del mig-29 de atacar dos blancos a la vez con R-27, capacidad que tambien tiene el sukhoi 27. ¿se refiere a mandar uno semiactivo y otro de infrarrojos o puede guiar dos radaricos a la vez?.

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Registrado: 30 Jul 2003, 20:51

Mensaje por pit »


No se en que parte del texto está, pero el radar N-019 y el N-001 solo pueden mantener MCGU (actualizaciones de guiado de medio curso) para 2 misiles tipo radárico R-27R/ER, pero contra UN solo blanco. En las versiones mejoradas por ejemplo la N-019M con el calculador Ts101M, se permite atacar DOS blancos a la vez pero con el R-77/RVV-AE.

Efectivamente se puede lanzar un R-27R y seguido, un R-27T contra el mismo blanco. Si se lanzan mas de 2 R-27R/ER contra un mismo blanco, después del segundo, los misiles carecerán del MCGU proporcionado desde los lóbulos laterales del radar transmisor.


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