La Guerra de Chechenia

Guerras y conflictos modernos desde 1945, como las guerras de Corea y Vietnam, hasta las de Afganistán o la Agresión de Rusia a Ucrania. La Guerra Fría.
Andres
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La Guerra de Chechenia

Mensaje por Andres »

Saludos,


Hasta ahora solo he podido conseguir poca informacion, la mayoria desde discuciones en distintos foros y publicaciones rn ls FMSO.

Esta guerra se dividio en varias partes y se caracterizo tanto por la ineptitud de los Rusos como las tacticas brutales utilizados por ambos lados.
Ejemplo de eso es la c*g*da que pusieron los rusos en "Grozny 2", esto se debe a que ese ejercito no tiene una doctrina de MOUT planteada y adiestradas a las tropas que participaron. Dejaron una ciudad en ruinas y mucha gente inocente murio.

Tambien se vieron varios tanques rusos destruidos en esta batalla, y un numero de bajas brutal, aqui un extracto de un articulo llamado "Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles For Grozny"

Chechens weren't afraid of tanks and BMPs. They assigned groups of RPG gunners to fire volleys at the lead and trail vehicles. Once they were destroyed, the others were picked off one-by-one. The Russian forces lost 20 of 26 tanks, 102 of 120 BMPs, and 6 of 6 ZSU-23s in the first three day's fighting.


De resto el ejercito ruso se porto muy bien (salvo por las masacres a civiles), tanto asi que ya se acabo con casi todos los lideres. Excepto por las guerrillas que hay en ese pais.



Fox Mulder
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Mensaje por Fox Mulder »

La Operación Antiterrorista llevada a cabo por las fuerzas federales en Chechenia en 1999-2000 fue un espectacular éxito desde varios puntos de vista.

Sería demasiado extenso detallar todas y cada una de las operaciones llevadas a cabo (esto es algo que supone un inmenso esfuerzo, en el que me encuentro inmerso, en los próximos tres años confío en poder finalizar la tesis doctoral sobre el conflicto en Chechenia y poder publicarlo).

Hay que recordar que dicha operación antiterrorista se llevó a cabo tras la invasión de grupos extremistas wahabíes financiados por Arabia Saudí de la República de Daguestán. También es necesario recordar la voladura llevada a cabo por extremistas caucásicos de tres edificios, dos en Moscú y otro en Volgodonsk.

Básicamente me remito al libro "El laberinto Checheno" de la periodista Anne Nivat, que relata con pelos y señales la espectacular operación "Caza De Lobos", donde Leche Dudayev (Alcalde de Grozny) y Ismailov (Jefe Operaciones Terroristas Chechenos) y varios de los hermanos Akhmadov junto con cientos de terroristas fueron exterminados de forma inmisericorde. El general Valeri Shamanov llevó a cabo una de las operaciones más arriesgadas y exitosas de toda la historia militar moderna, simulando ser sobornado por Shamyl Bassayev con 100.000 dólares, y posteriormente emboscándolos y aplastándolos en la localidad-ratonera de Alkan-Jala. El propio Bassayev perdió una pierna.

La propia Nivat denunció la presencia masiva de terroristas saudíes en Chechenia. Dispongo de un análisis completo del plan de operaciones de liberación ruso, tácticamente implecable.

Respecto a las supuestas masacres de civiles, en todos los conflictos bélicos es inevitable que mueran civiles. Pero lo que sí es claro es que no hubo matanzas premeditadas, sino daños colaterales, motivados en gran medida por los misiles Scud caducados utilizados en la primera fase de las operaciones.

Continuará.



alejandro_
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Mensaje por alejandro_ »

Andres

Hay que saber diferenciar entre la primera y segunda guerra de Chechenia.

En la primera hubo una serie de desastres que en mi opinion fueron causados por la criminal gestion de Yeltsin y algunos generales incompetentes. El asalto fallido a Grozni fue uno de estos.

En cambio en la segunda las lecciones fueron aplicadas y el desarrollo de la campaña ha sido diferente. Por ejemplo muy pocos tanques fueron perdidos (no llegaran ni a la docena) frente a las terribles perdidas en 1994.

Saludos.



CASTELO
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Mensaje por CASTELO »

Sería interesante Fox , y siempre que te lo permita tu derecho a propiedad intelectual y privada, que publicaras al menos algunos extractos de tu tesis en el foro y nos explicaras algo (al menos lo básico) de las , según tú, brillantes operaciones militares y policiales que han llevado al descabezamiento de los terroristas chechenos, amén del armamento usado, etc...a ser posible claro.

Un saludo, Castelo.



Andres
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Mensaje por Andres »

alejandro_ escribió:Andres

Hay que saber diferenciar entre la primera y segunda guerra de Chechenia.

En la primera hubo una serie de desastres que en mi opinion fueron causados por la criminal gestion de Yeltsin y algunos generales incompetentes. El asalto fallido a Grozni fue uno de estos.

En cambio en la segunda las lecciones fueron aplicadas y el desarrollo de la campaña ha sido diferente. Por ejemplo muy pocos tanques fueron perdidos (no llegaran ni a la docena) frente a las terribles perdidas en 1994.

Saludos.



Siempre ha sido una confusion, es que estoy interesando en esa guerra para ver como operan la FAS Rusas, ya que he generalizado, insultado, etc etc sin poseer suficientes datos para hacerlo.

Me podrias ampliar la informacion?

Saludos amigo



alejandro_
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Mensaje por alejandro_ »

La primera guerra en Chechenia fue impulsada por Yeltsin, que pensaba que iba a ser un paseo militar.

Creo que las razones de la intervencion fueron la anarquia reinante en la zona y el regimen de Dudayev. Los rusos llevaban desde el 91 intentando echarle del poder y apoyaban un movimiento en su contra.

La intervencion desde el principio fue un desastre, el Ejercito no estaba preparado y se cometieron un monton de errores.

Para empezar se mandaron a reclutas sin apenas entrenamiento, las tripulaciones de los tanques casi ni se conocian antes de entrar en accion, no habia mapas de la ciudad o zonas, las comunicaciones eran malas y los chechenos podian escucharlo todo con sus scanners, incluso hasta causaron fuego amigo haciendose pasar por soldados rusos. Los soldados rusos a veces no recibian ni comida caliente y se la tenian que suministrar civiles chechenos.

Las tropas especiales fueron utilizadas como carne de cañon, los tanques fueron empleados en Grozni sin apoyo de infanteria, en fin, toda una tragedia.

Los chechenos habian sido despreciados cuando se trataban de enemigos con mucho entrenamiento (1000 de ellos incluso habian estado en Afganistan) y llevaban años combatiendo en una guerra civil.

Otro factor de peso fue la continua interferencia de los politicos en la campaña, muchas veces cuando los rusos conseguian algo los politicos iintervenian y los rebeldes se podian reorganizar y cosas de ese estilo.

Lo unico que se salvo un poco fue la aviacion, muchos de los pilotos tenian experiencia de la guerra de Afganistan y las perdidas no fueron muy elevadas, a pesar de que el material no era siempre el mejor.

La segunda campaña fue tras los atentados en Moscu, esta vez los errores fueron aplicados, los reclutas fueron entrenados antes de intervenir y se llevaban unidades enteras en vez de pequeños destacamentos de varios. Los politicos se comprometieron a poyar la intervencion y dar mano libre a los militares.

Se organizo un mando unico (en la primera guerra el Ejercito, Aviacion, tropas del ministerio del interior iban a su bola) y todo avance era precedido por bombardeos, no habia precipitacion en el avance.
Otra ventaja era que la guerra era apoyada por la poblacion rusa yel mando ruso se esforzo en reducir las perdidas.

Las tropas especiales fueron utilizadas en su papel y dieron muy buenos resultados. La trampa que les tendieron a los guerrilleros chechenos que abandonaban Grozni fue un buen ejemplo.

Ademas se controlo lo que emitian los periodistas (en la primera guerra los chechenos ganaron la batalla informativa) y se procuro dar esa lamentable imagen tan tipica de la primera guerra.

Andres, esto es a rasgos generales lo que he leido. Tengo en casa un fasciculo de la revista Raids bastante bueno sobre esta guerra.

Saludos.



alejandro_
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Mensaje por alejandro_ »

Andres

Ahi va un enlace, aunque supongo que lo conoceras:

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/chechnya.htm

Un cordial saludo.



Fox Mulder
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Mensaje por Fox Mulder »

Publicar un libro sobre el Cáucaso Norte (en especial sobre Chechenia) es una de las mayores ilusiones que tengo hoy por hoy.

En primer lugar decir que acabo de iniciar el programa de doctorado. Por tanto, primero debo superar 20 créditos en asignaturas. Estoy matriculado en Historia Militar Contemporánea, Del Terrorismo Internacional al Terrorismo Global y Conflictos Nacionales en Europa del Este, entre otras complejas y extensísimas asignaturas. Posteriormente deberé superar 12 créditos en una investigación original (tarde o temprano tendré que alcanzar la capital rebelde de Abjasia del Norte Sukhumi y la capital de Chechenia Grozny -la última vez llegé hasta la República del Daguestán Kaspiisk, di media vuelta y volví escopetado a Volgogrado). Posteriormente, después de conseguir la DEA, podré iniciar la tesis doctoral. Espero no tardar más de cuatro años en publicarla. Lo que sí es seguro es que si finalmente consigo escribirlo lo publicaré aunque tenga que costear todos los gastos de mi bolsillo (publicación y distribución).

Respecto a artículos de interés sobre Chechenia, ya publiqué varios artículos en un portal militar tristemente desaparecido. Estoy fuera de casa, no los tengo a mano, pero puedo colgarlos otra vez aquí, aunque quizá sean un poco extensos. Darme un poco de tiempo, para que me los manden de casa a mi mail, y pueda insertarlos en un par de extensos post.

No se puede hablar sólo de Chechenia, dado que no se trata de un conflicto aislado. Primero habría que hablar de la guerra entre Osetia del Norte y la República de Ingushetia tras la descomposición de la URSS. Tengan en cuenta que las fronteras dentro de la extinta URSS eran completamente ficticias, de vez en cuando se modificaban sin atenerse a ningún criterio coherente. Por eso, tras la implosión soviética, las fronteras ficticias, sin ninguna credibilidad, de la noche a la mañana se convirtieron en fronteras reales.

Millones de rusos se acostaron en la URSS y se levantaron por ejemplo en Georgia, cuando ellos eran rusos eslavos rusófonos (hablaban ruso) y tenían clarísimos lazos culturales, económicos, familiares, etc. con Rusia. Es por esto, por lo que estallaron numerosos conflictos. Entre ellos la guerra en Abjasia del Norte, en la que por primera vez hace aparición Shamyl Bassayev, el carnicero del Cáucaso.

Hay que destacar también el dramático conflicto en Nagorno-Karabaj, guerra entre Armenia y Azerbayán y la dramática intervención rusa en defensa de sus hermanos cristianos ortodoxos. En esta guerra un batallón wahabí financiado por Arabia Saudí hizo acto de presencia, siendo derrotado por las fuerzas conjuntas ruso-armenias.

Continuará



alejandro_
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Mensaje por alejandro_ »

Tan solo añadir un interesante articulo sobre los tanques rusos en Chechenia:


Some Russian tankers' experiences in the second Chechen war

Adam Geibel
07/01/2001
Armor

Before the war broke out in Dagestan, the Russian Army had a small T-72 group in the 136th Brigade, while MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops units were using T-55 tanks. When the Chechens first crossed over into Dagestan in August, 1999, there was a minor curiosity in one of the Russians' tank sheds at Boktiah - a T-- 72 fitted with ERA set up "for export" to India.

Rumor had it that the deployment of a battalion of these to the 138th MR Brigade was stopped when it was discovered that soldiers had been selling the explosive from their tanks' reactive armor. When the Russians struck back, this T-72BM was put at the head of a company column along the route to Buynaksk. It was soon nicknamed the "Nomad Tank." The crew would receive information from either an artillery forward observer or even a local resident, then drive covertly, but at high speed, into the area indicated. The tank would move independently, without accompanying infantry. Moving offroad along mountain ravines, the tank remained unnoticeable to observers until it reached a suitable firing position, where the crew would fire four to five rounds at the target indicated and then disappear back into the ravines.

Over several days, the Russians claimed that a mujihadeen weapons caravan, three mortar teams, and two munitions dumps were destroyed by this method. During the battle for Rakhata, the Nomad rejoined the company. Gunner Sergeant Aleksey R. was employing the main gun to suppress Chechen assault riflemen firing from windows, when return fire from four sides by grenade launchers hit the tank several times and the engine died. The driver-mechanic tried to start it, but the engine wouldn't turn over until several tense minutes had passed. The Russians were convinced that the tank survived the battle only because of the reactive armor blocks.

The shaped charge grenades burned through several layers of the turret armor, split the side, and completely removed the sights. The crew came out of the battle bruised and the officer acting as vehicle commander was only wounded.3 For the rest of the T-72 crews, life was full of interesting problems. One T-72 driver-mechanic, contract service Warrant Officer Protsenko, noted in a May 2000 interview that, "In the mountains, the engines overheated. There was not enough power; in fact, it was necessary to stop at 1200 meters. The tracks did not reliably grip the stony soil, especially if there was ice. And it was cold in the tanks. If heat was maintained in the combat compartment, then there was none in the control [driver's] compartment."

The crews were able to overcome some of these problems. Claws were fitted to the tracks to improve traction. In the mountains or in low temperatures and humidity, the reloading mechanism's control unit sometimes failed, so the crews would warm them up over a campfire until they ran normally. Some problems were endemic to the T-72's design. The installation and removal of the tank's AKB storage batteries was difficult even under ordinary conditions. The batteries ran down quickly during the winter, and in order to change them, the 70 kg driver-mechanic's seat had to be removed and the equally heavy AKBs raised vertically through a hatch.

The mujihadeen took advantage of another of the T-72's weaknesses: after firing, the main gun stops on the hydrostop for reloading, giving the Chechens an opportunity to attack the tank. Sergeant Petelnik, a T-72 tank commander and contract serviceman, noted that, "The rebels tried to attack the left side of the turret and the space beneath the turret, trying first of all to knock the sights out of operation. Sometimes they were successful." After five or six hours of continuous firing, the sabot ejection rack in some T-72s became unserviceable and the magazine lifting mechanism failed. In that case, the ammunition stowage location in the tanks' fighting compartments made it difficult for crews to load the gun from the manual ammunition stowage racks.

After the basic load of ammunition was expended, the tank had to leave its position in order to reload a container. Valuable time was lost and in leaving the position, the crew exposed its position and was also forced to leave the vehicle, thereby subjecting themselves to small arms fire. Russian tankers said they wished for an armored transport-- reloading vehicle like those supplied to the missile troops. Others complained about the T-72's fire suppression equipment (PPO), the difficulties detecting the enemy in "complex" conditions with the current vision devices, and the need for secure communications equipment (updated R-174 tank inter-phone systems were mentioned).

The mujihadeen had a nasty habit of eavesdropping, sometimes even interjecting bogus commands on unsecure Russian radio traffic. This occurred even down to company and platoon level. Combat operations also illustrated the necessity of equipping all crew members with assault rifles. At the beginning of October 1999, Private Aleksandr Pavlovich Perekrest, a tank driver-mechanic, found himself in Chechnya. Having served for 18 months, he was only six months short of being demobilized. Perekrest described being under fire: "The most horrible thing is when they fire at you for the first time. At first, I let go of the control levers while under fire.

The first time was horrifying and later it was nothing, you think: `I'm sitting in an armored vehicle - nothing will happen." Ironically, the private's tank was attached to an infantry platoon and at a position two kilometers from Samashki, it was hit by Chechen mortar fire.4 Even though Perekest had jumped into the tank's hatch, the explosion tore off his hand, temporarily blinded him, and riddled his chest with shrapnel. He regained his sight after three days in the hospital. Perekrest considered his T-72 obsolete, but noted that "there were even older ones - there were T-62s."

Saludos.



Andres
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Mensaje por Andres »

Aqui pongo un Articulo de Red Thrust Star:

The Chechen War: Part II


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BY 1LT JAMES REED
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
C DETACHMENT,
203RD MI BATTALION


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In this, Part II of a three part series, well take a look at the Russian attack on Chechnya's capital city of Grozny. Part I focused on the history of Chechnya and its people. Part III will explore Russian lessons learned from the war.

In October of 1991, Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet nuclear bomber pilot, was elected president of the Republic of Chechnya. Soon after, he declared Chechnya a free and independent state. Russian political leaders did not take his declaration of independence well, and organized a covert military campaign to oust Dudayev, which included supplying opposition groups with money and weapons. Dudayev knew that if these Kremlin-supported opposition groups were not able to wrestle power away from him, then some day the Russian Army might be used against him, in order to enforce Russias will. Dudayev spent the three years leading up to the war (1991-1994) preparing his republic for this inevitable Russian invasion.

On December 11, 1994, the Russian invasion of Chechnya began. The initial Russian plan called for a three stage attack.1 The first stage called for three columns to advance on Grozny from the north, west, and east, leaving the south open for Dudayev and his forces to withdraw to the mountains. Russian leaders did not expect Dudayev to stay and fight in the city. The second stage called for the establishment of a new pro-Russian political leader in Grozny, and for this person to begin the slow and deliberate winning of the hearts and minds of the Chechen people. The third and final stage called for the mopping-up of Dudayev and any of his remaining resistance forces in the mountains. Russian leaders hoped to complete the entire operation within three years.


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Commanders were stunned at the amount of resistance they encountered. They did not expect to see any fighting until after having taken the city.


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At the outset, the Russian plan began to break down. The western and eastern columns were attacked even before they crossed their lines of departure. A 1992 Russian military operation involving ethnic cleansing in the neighboring republic of North Ossetia had fueled a hatred for the Russians, and gave these people a reason for attacking the Russian columns as they moved on Grozny. Whether or not Dudayev asked for their help against the Russians or they just took it upon themselves to attack is unclear. The northern column almost made it to Grozny before being attacked by Chechens and getting bogged down. Commanders were stunned at the amount of resistance they encountered. They did not expect to see any fighting until after having taken the city. Also, civilians blocked the columns on several occasions, causing the commanders of the western and eastern columns to slightly shift their axis of advance to less populated areas. At one point, civilian demonstrations actually blocked the eastern column for several days. Before ever reaching the city, both the western and eastern columns were rendered combat ineffective by roadblocks, obstacles, ambushes, and sniper and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. The total number of Russian troops involved in this initial push on Grozny is estimated at 10,000.

By 24 December Russian forces had finally surrounded Grozny. While many expected them to completely encircle the city and either starve or bomb its inhabitants, Russian leaders decided instead to storm the city.

Dudayev, not deserting Grozny as the Russians expected him to do, used the next seven days to prepare his defenses, refine his defensive plan, and stockpile supplies. He was using the still as yet unsealed opening in the southern part of the city to move in supplies and ammunition.

Also during this week, Russian artillery and air strikes began to pummel the city. As the Russian Air Force began its air campaign its repercussions were being felt throughout the republic. Chechens, finally realizing Russian's intention to destroy them, began pouring into the city to augment its small band of defenders.

The Russian Air Force at this time also began bombing other nearby villages. Not realizing that many of these villages were pockets of anti-Dudayev/pro-Russian support, the Air Force effectively encouraged all Chechens, regardless of their political affiliation, to unite in a common defense of their homeland.

By the 31 December attack there were at least 5,000 fully armed male Chechens ready to defend Grozny. Almost all of these men had served in the Russian military as conscripts and knew well its tactics.

While the Chechens only had small numbers of anti-aircraft artillery and shoulder fired surface to air missiles (SAMs) to defend against air attacks, the overcast winter weather kept the Russians from effectively employing their precision-guided munitions within Grozny. In fact, Russian troops were often the target of their own air campaign. Once the fighting began within the city, the Chechens used radio direction finding equipment to locate forward air controllers (FACs) callIng for air support and would then bring heavy direct fire to bear upon these FACs. They would also break into FAC radio nets and direct aircraft into attacking their own troops.2

Combat aircraft employed were the Su-17/FITTER, Su-24/ FENCER, Su-25/FROGFOOT, Su-27/FLANKER, Mig-31/FOXHOUND, and the Tu-22M3/ BACKFIRE. Initially, the Air Force quickly destroyed all Chechen aircraft and airfields. Most of what the Chechens had were simply training aircraft. Concrete-piercing high-explosive bombs were employed to crater airfield runways, and later were used against Groznys Presidential Palace.

Russian Army Aviation consisted of approximately two squadrons of MI-24/HIND helicopters, two squadrons of Mi-8/HIP, and several Mi-26/HALO heavy lift helicopters. Interestingly, attack helicopters (MI-24s) played almost no role In the attack on Grozny. They were used leading up to the assault, but once it began, on 31 December, only Air Force fixed-wing aircraft were used to support operations within the city.

The 1994 New Years Eve assault into Grozny was intended to be a complete surprise to the Chechens. However, they were so well prepared that it really did not matter. The Russian plan called for four different strike forces to attack into the heart of the city toward objectives on, or near, the central Presidential Palace.

Each strike force consisted of a motorized rifle brigade. In actuality, after taking into account that units were operating at only about 30-50 percent strength, each strike force was approximately the size of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion, comprised of roughly five hundred soldiers. Most were conscripts who had a year or less of service in the Russian Army. The other part of the plan called for two groups of Spetsnaz to be inserted by helicopter into the mountains south of the city to disrupt the enemys rear.

It is interesting to note that the Russians had no maps of the city, and their main strategy seemed to be to simply charge forward, to get in and drive toward the center of the city. The Hero of Russia medal, Russias highest award, was offered to the first infantry squad to get into the Presidential Palace.

It is estimated that the Chechens had initially only 42 T-72s, 38 BMPs, 26 BTRs, 14 BRDMs, an unknown number of Luna-8 and Luna-8M multiple rocket launcher systems, an unknown number of 152-millimeter self-propelled howitzers, approximately 150 pieces of towed artillery, and a large number of antitank weapons to defend the city.

Only one of the four strike groups reached its objective, a few hundred meters north of the Palace. All four groups were essentially annihilated. The 131st Maykop Motorized Rifie Brigade was particularly hard hit, with all of the brigades officers killed in action, 20 of 26 tanks destroyed, and 102 of 120 BMPs destroyed. Most of the Spetsnaz troops surrendered to the Chechens, "......after wandering about hopelessly for three days without food, let alone any clear idea of what they were supposed to do."3

Assuming that the Russians would attack head-long into the heart of the city, using the central Presidential Palace as their main objective, Dudayev prepared his city by creating corridors along the main city streets for BMPs and tanks to advance toward the Palace. Using obstacles to barricade off smaller side streets, the Chechens were able to destroy large numbers of enemy vehicles by attacking them with RPGs from atop buildings and from the rear of the columns. Once lead and tail vehicles of the columns were taken out, most others were trapped.

Dudayev prepared and organized his men for the coming battle. He made his defenses flexible and mobile, created avenues of approach for the enemy to move along, stockpiled food and ammunition, organized his men into small bands of 20-50 armed with light weapons, and prepared them mentally to be cut off.

While waiting for RPG gunners to engage a target, Chechens would spray the tops of vehicles with machine gun fire, keeping infantryman buttoned-up. RPGs and Molotov cocktails were used to disable Russian vehicles, causing their occupants to dismount, usually dyingnearby in a hail of machine gun fire.

Chechens even attacked Russian second-echelon forces outside the city. A unit of airborne soldiers and an artillery battalion were both raided.

While the Russian attack called for airborne units to be air-assaulted in along the four separate attack routes to seize key buildings, intersections, and choke points, it seems no one bothered to coordinate with these units. At some point during the day, airborne units, realizing that they had been left out of the operation, began to march into the city, in hopes of being able to support their mechanized comrades.

Many incidences of friendly fire were reported, and Russian units often fought each other for hours before realizing what was happening. By late afternoon the Russian assault had ground to a halt. Chechens roamed the city searching for targets and survivors.

The 31 December assault on Grozny was a disaster for the Russians. They continued, however, to attack Grozny for several months. It took until 26 January to finally capture the Presidential Palace, and street fighting still raged throughout February. By the end of March, 1995, Grozny had finally been taken. It is, however, just a shell of the once prosperous city it had been. Having been leveled by air and artillery strikes, only 100,000 out of 400,000 of the citys residents remain.


They really screwed it up.



alejandro_
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Mensaje por alejandro_ »

Andres

Su-17/FITTER, Su-24/ FENCER, Su-25/FROGFOOT, Su-27/FLANKER, Mig-31/FOXHOUND, and the Tu-22M3/ BACKFIRE


Creo que el articulo es un poco inexacto en los modelos de avion utilizados. Los Fitters fueron retirados muy poco despues de la desintegracion de la URSS (como todos los aviones de 1 motor). dudo que los empleasen.

Se penso en utilizar los Tu-22M3 Backfire para bombardear Grozni en plan "alfombrado de bombas" :shock: :shock: pero al final no se utilizo esta via por ser considerada demasiado bestia.

Me cuesta creer que se empleasen MiG-31 Foxhounds porque literalmente no tenian ninguna mision que realizar en Chechenia, al contrario de los Fencers y Frogfoots. Los Flanker se utilizaron en tareas de reconocimiento e intercepcion de alguna avioneta que queria lanzar suministros si no recuerdo mal.

Saludos.



Andres
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Mensaje por Andres »

In December 1994, the Russian Army entered the break-away Republic of Chechnya and attempted to seize the Chechen capital of Grozny from the march. After this attempt failed, the Russian Army spent two months in deliberate house-to-house fighting before finally capturing the city.1 The dispirited Russian conscript force was badly mauled by the more-mature, dedicated Chechen force, and the war drags on to this day. During the first month of the conflict, Russian forces wrote off 225 armored vehicles as nonrepairable battle losses. This represents 10.23% of the armored vehicles initially committed to the campaign. The Russians evacuated some of these 225 hulls to the Kubinka test range for analysis. General Lietitenant A. Galkin, the head of the Armor Directorate, held a conference on their findings on 20 February l995. The Minister of Defense attended the conference.2 The results of the conference convinced the Russian Minister of Defense to stop procuring tanks with gas-turbine engines.3 Further, the analysis disclosed Chechen anti-armor tactics and the vulnerabilities of Russian armored vehicles in urban combat.

Chechen Anti-armor Techniques

The Chechen forces are armed with Soviet and Russian-produced weapons and most Chechen fighters served in the Soviet Armed Forces. The Chechen lower-level combat group consists of fifteen to twenty personnel subdivided into three or four-man fighting cells. These cells consist of an antitank gunner (normally armed with the RPG-7 or RPG-18 shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher), a machine gunner, and a sniper.4 Additional personnel serve as ammunition bearers and assistant gunners. Chechen combat groups would deploy these cells as anti-armor hunter-killer teams. The sniper and machine gunner would pin down the supporting infantry while the antitank gunner would engage the armored target. Teams deploy at ground level, in second and third stories, and in basements. Normally five or six hunter-killer teams simultaneously attack a single armored vehicle. Kill shots are generally made against the top, rear and sides of vehicles. Chechens also drop bottles filled with gasoline or jellied fuel on top of vehicles.5 The Chechen hunter-killer teams try to trap vehicle columns in city streets where destruction of the first and last vehicles will trap the column and allow its total destruction.

The elevation and depression of the Russian main tank guns are incapable of dealing with hunter-killer teams fighting from basements and second- or third-story positions, and the simultaneous attack from five or six teams negate the effectiveness of the tank's machine guns. The Russians attached ZSU-23-4 and 256 track-mounted anti-aircraft guns to armored columns to respond to these difficult-to-engage hunter-killer teams.6

Initial Russian vehicle losses were due to a combination of inappropriate tactics, underestimation of the opposing force, and a lack of combat readiness. The Russians moved into Grozny without encircling it and sealing it off from reinforcements. They planned to take the city from the march without dismounting. Due to shortages in personnel, the Russian columns consisted of composite units, and most personnel carriers traveled with few or no dismounts. These initial columns were decimated.

As the Russians regrouped, they brought in more infantry and began a systematic advance through the city, house-by-house and block-by-block. Russian armored vehicle losses dropped off with their change in tactics. Russian infantry moved in front with armored combat vehicles in support or in reserve. Some Russian vehicles were outfitted with a cage of wire mesh mounted some 25-30 centimeters away from the hull armor to defeat the shaped charges of an antitank grenade launcher, as well as to protect the vehicle from a Molotov cocktail or bundle of explosives. The Russians began establisling ambushes on approach routes into a selected area and then running vehicles into the area as bait to destroy Chechen hunter-killer teams.7

Vulnerabilities of Russian Armored Vehicles

Shoulder-fired antitank weapons and antitank grenades knocked out the bulk of armored
vehicles, and each destroyed vehicle took an average of three to six lethal hits.8 Fuel cells and engines are favorite aiming points for Chechen antitank gunners. The following illustrations have a grey area superimposed which shows the area where 90% of the lethal hits occurred.9

The BMD-1 is a personnel carrier assigned to airborne forces. As such, it is lightly armored. See Figure 1.

It was vulnerable to front, rear, flanking and top-down fire. The front portion of the turret is reinforced and, subsequently, is not vulnerable, but the rear of the turret is. See Figure 2.

There is more armor on the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle. However, its top armor is weak, its fuel tanks are within the rear doors, and the drivers compartment is vulnerable. See Figure 3.

The BTR-70 wheeled armored personnel carrier showed many of the same vulnerabilities as the BMD and BMP.

Sixty-two tanks were destroyed in the first months fighting in Chechnya. Over 98% (apparently 61 tanks) were knocked out by rounds which impacted in areas not protected by reactive armor. The Russians employed the T-72 and T-80 tank in Chechnya. See Figures 4 and 5. They were both invulnerable to frontal shots, since the front is heavily armored and covered with reactive armor. Kill shots were made at those points where there is no reactive armor: the sides and rear and, on top shots, on the drivers hatch and the rear of the turret and rear deck. Early in the conflict, most Russian tanks went into combat without their reactive armor. They were particularly vulnerable to damaging or lethal frontal hits without it.10

Conclusions

The Chechen forces developed effective techniques to defeat Russian armored vehicles on the streets of a large city. Many of their techniques can be adapted by other armed forces which might fight Russian-manufactured armored vehicles (or other types of armored vehicles) in urban combat. These techniques are:

Organize anti-tank hunter-killer teams which include a machine gunner and a sniper to protect the antitank gunner by suppressing infantry which is accompanying the armored vehicles.
Select anti-armor ambush areas in sections of the city where buildings restrict and canalize the movement of armored vehicles.
Lay out the ambush in order to seal vehicles in the kill zone.
Use multiple hunter-killer teams to engage armored vehicles from basements, ground level, and from second- or third-floor positions. Problems with the RPG-7 and RPG-18 antitank weapons are the backblast, signature and time lapse between shots. The Chechens solved the time lapse problem by engaging each target simultaneously with five or six antitank weapons. (From this, the obvious requirement for a future anti-armor weapon for urban combat is a low-signature, multi-shot, recoil-attenuated, light-weight weapon which can be fired from inside enclosures. The AT-4 and Javelin do not appear to meet these requirements).
Engage armored targets from the top, rear and sides. Shots against frontal armor protected by reactive armor only serve to expose the gunner.
Engage accompanying air-defense guns first.



Fox Mulder
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Registrado: 29 Jun 2003, 16:18

Mensaje por Fox Mulder »

2004-02-02 11:11

LOS SERVICIOS SECRETOS DE EE UU AYUDARON A LOCALIZAR EN CHECHENIA UNA BANDA DE TERRORISTAS



Washington, 2 de febrero, RIA "Novosti". El pasado diciembre los servicios secretos de EE UU, utilizando los métodos de intercepción electrónica y fotografías desde ingenios espaciales, ayudaron a "localizar una banda de terroristas chechenos, buscados por los delitos de asesinato y de secuestro de personas que intentó huir de Chechenia a Daguestán a través de los montes", informó este lunes la revista "US News and World Report". Según los datos de la revista, las unidades especiales del Ejército ruso abatieron a 37 bandidos armados. En la operación participaron artillería y aviación. En opinión de la revista, esta operación es un ejemplo de cooperación entre EE UU y Rusia en la lucha contra el terrorismo que por regla se realiza en el ambiente de secretismo.


Hace mucho tiempo que denuncié la vigilancia vía satélite de Chechenia por parte de los Estados Unidos. Hubo fuertes rumores referentes a la aparición de fotografías vía satélite en cadáveres de terroristas chechenos en 1999 y 2000. Parece que los tiempos han cambiado y todo el mundo empieza a tener claro el bando en que debe alistarse.

Saludos



kilo009
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Registrado: 18 Ene 2003, 13:21

Mensaje por kilo009 »

Valentina Fedúlova, presidenta de la comisión de la presidencia de Rusia para prisioneros de guerra, afirmó que unos 600 soldados rusos se encuentran desaparecidos en la separatista república de Chechenia. Especificó que en los últimos diez años, desde 1994 hasta el primero de abril de 2004, en territorio chechenio fueron dados por desaparecidos 578 efectivos rusos.



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Ave_Negra
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Mensajes: 1728
Registrado: 16 Feb 2003, 16:27
Ubicación: Mar del Plata, Argentina
Argentina

...

Mensaje por Ave_Negra »

(Futuro post de Ave_Negra)

Título: "Guerra de Irak (desde el punto de vista militar)"

Mensaje: "Esta guerra se dividio en varias partes y se caracterizo tanto por la ineptitud de los Yanquis como las tacticas brutales utilizados por ambos lados.
Ejemplo de eso es la c*g*da que pusieron los yanquis en "Falluyah", esto se debe a que ese ejercito no tiene una doctrina de MOUT planteada y adiestradas a las tropas que participaron. Dejaron una ciudad en ruinas y mucha gente inocente murio."

:lol: :P perdón, no pude resistirme...sigan con lo suyo que está muy interesante.... :thumbs:


\\\\\\\\\\\"Da la libertad al hombre débil, y él mismo se atará y te la devolverá. Para el corazón débil la libertad no tiene sentido\\\\\\\\\\\"
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