Ministerio de Defensa de Rusia anuncia destrucción masiva de tanques desfasados
El reporte no menciona a los T-72, pero ante el exceso de números, la necesidad de renovación y limitadas ventas al exterior, estos tanques también tienen los años contados.
It matters not how strait the gate. How charged with punishments the scroll.
I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul. - From "Invictus", poem by William Ernest Henley
¿Qué es este vehículo antiaéreo fotografiado en el último desfile en Corea del Norte, parecen estar cañón automático de 57mm http://i39.tinypic.com/2mecnr6.jpg
Siempre filmado durante el desfile, este vehículo de AA es mucho más moderno, parece que como un arma para usar un sistema de arma de 30mm ruso naval AK-230, como puede verse en la foto abajo. Nótese el sistema de refrigeración de los sistemas 2, es similar http://i43.tinypic.com/246ugsl.jpg
Esta foto muestra la nueva exposición de armas y equipo del Ejército Popular de Corea, ofrece una visión increíble en lo que los norcoreanos han estado haciendo durante los últimos años. Todo, desde las dos variantes Gun Koksan de lo que parece ser parte del árbol del tanque Ch'onma-Ho de la familia es muy impresionante. La pantalla más significativo sin embargo, es claramente el II P'okpoong-Ho (mi designación) al final de la actualización Ch'onma-Ho línea. Este museo es mucho más allá de las malas instalaciones y exhibiciones de los museos más conocidos de Corea del Norte (como el "Victorious Liberación de la Patria Museo de la Guerra"), es difícil creer que se encuentra en Corea del Norte. Más a seguir en este museo tarde .. Editado por Jim Warford - Tank Net
El jefe militar israelí cree que Irán se abstendrá de desarrollar armas nucleares.
- El jefe del Estado Mayor, Benny Gantz, sostiene que las presiones diplomáticas y económicas de la comunidad internacional acabarán por disuadir al régimen de los ayatolás de producir armamento atómico.
Renault Trucks Defense aprovecha la exhibición de armas y equipos terrestres "EuroSatory 2012" que tiene lugar en Francia para presentar su VAB "Ultima" :
Este vehículo blindado, que es la última evolución del famoso VAB de la empresa, tiene un nuevo blindaje mejorado ofreciendo un nivel de protección 4 (OTAN STANAG 4569) a sus tripulantes : 3 + 7 soldados, tiene une masa de 20 toneladas y puede alcanzar velocidad de 105 km/h gracias a su motor de unos 360 ch. Puede sobrepasar obstáculos de 0.5 metros y zanjas/cunetas de 1m de hondo. Beneficia de ruedas que se hinchan con una presión variable según el terreno, el suelo encontrado y puede ser trasladado en un Hercules C130.
Es armado con una torrecita pertrechada con un cañon de 25 o 30mm, el modelo presentado que se puede ver en estas fotos tiene el sistema TRT-25 de BAe System
Canceling the Merkava and Namer–A Wise Decision Shmuel Gordon 1/3/2012
We recently learned of how the defense establishment recommended ending the Merkava Tank and Namer APC project. A tremendous disaster, allegedly; the increasing of the ground forces’ strength will be ceased and the IDF will suffer from difficulties facing the challenges before it. However, is this really the case? Let’s examine what the challenges really are – are the Merkava and Namer suitable for the confrontation? Does this decision reflect a change (an undeclared one) in the national threat assessment, the force buildup, and in the defense perception? Finally, does the closure of these projects weaken the IDF? These are considerable issues worthy of a series of articles, but we’ll make do with a brief and concise response.
The state of Israel has three types of threats: terror, regular armies, and a third-circle threat. Prior to the Yom Kippur War, the gravest threat came from the Egyptian and Syrian militaries. Because of this, large and strong ground force was established. In recent decades, a gradual change has occurred in the severity of these threats. As the regular army threat lessened, the terror threat strengthened, and the distant nuclear threat strengthened the most. The weakening of the neighboring countries, the peace agreements, and Iraq and Syria’s deterioration have all considerably lessened the threat posed by the regular armies. The regional instability requires us to maintain a strong ground force, yet the distance is considerable between this and the allocation of approximately 15 billion NIS for its strengthening.
For dozens of years, the calls have been heard to shape a different operational perception—one that relies less on ground forces. Israel’s military force buildup did not adjust properly to the changes, the defense establishment did not update the defense perception sufficiently enough, and the IDF has not carried out necessary changes in its perception of operating a military force. The writing has been on the wall for at least 30 years, but the bureaucratic inter-branched balance of powers in the defense establishment have prevented the essential revolution.
A revolution in the perceptions of force operation and buildup are only created when influenced by disaster, war, or a budgetary crisis. Fortunately, the defense budget reduction is filling in for war, and is enforcing revolutionary changes upon the defense establishment. Furthermore, the IDF decided to refrain from also cutting all the budget articles. It has understood which are the lesser significant projects that should be cut. Halting the production of the Merkava and Namer is a wise decision by the IDF leaders. The cutting of both projects is the result of the assessment that the ground threat has diminished, and that it is possible to halt the strengthening of the ground forces without harming national security.
In the past, we've demanded in IsraelDefense and in other newspapers that these projects, as well as two others which influence combat against regular armies, be cut. This call is based on a different perception of force operation, one in which the ground forces are not the primary axis. The top defense officials must reformulate the perception of force operation and design a new force buildup plan, one that will be based upon the evolutionary changes to the strength of the threats and the challenges at Israel’s doorstep.